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use#LAATOWARD NATIONAL UNIFORMITY FOR
FDA-REGULATED PRODUCTS
By Amy Elizabeth Semet
I. Introduction
Since 1906, the Food and Drug Administration (\FDA") has been the primary guardian of the safety of
the nation's food and drug supply. Every year, FDA's 2,100 scientists and 7,000 other employees monitor
about $1 trillion worth of products, inspect 15,000 facilities, and examine 80,000 product samples.1 Despite
the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation, states have assumed the role of \mini-FDAs,"2 in supervising the
regulation of drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and food. States have allowed their legislatures and their
courts to supersede FDA determinations of safety and ecacy. Manufacturers of FDA-regulated products,
faced with forced compliance with dierent domestic and international regulatory regimes, and in defending
products liability suits, must often meet standards of care that exceed what the FDA requires.
To combat this trend, in 1997, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
(\FDAMA")3 in order to mandate \national uniformity" for the regulation of over-the-counter (\OTC")
drugs and cosmetics.4 Under FDAMA, states may not pass \any requirement" that diers from federal
standards for OTC drugs.5 In contrast, state labeling on cosmetics is preempted, but states remain free to
1143 Cong. Rec. S9842 (Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
2Hearing on the FDA Approval Process Before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on Com-
merce, 103rd Cong., (May 2, 1996) (statement of James D. Cope, President of the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers
Association).
3Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
421 U.S.C. x 379r; FDAMA x 412; FDCA x 751(a); 21 U.S.C. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(a).
521 U.S.C. x 379r; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751(a). \In general, [e]xcept as provided in subsecton (b) (c)(1), (d), (e) or
1pass cosmetic safety standards as long as the federal government has not acted.6 Why is there a dierence
in the preemption standards for OTC drugs and cosmetics? As Senator Jeords noted during the FDAMA
debates, OTCs are not \any dierent" from cosmetics for \all intents and purposes," yet preemption of
OTCs was not nearly as objectionable as preemption of cosmetics.7 Further, the enactment of the national
uniformity provisions of FDAMA was not the rst time that Congress mandated divergent preemption
standards for dierent FDA-regulated products. The 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (\NLEA")8
preempted state labeling requirements for food, but allowed states to regulate safety standards exceeding
those of the FDA.9 Legislation has recently been introduced to expand the spirit of the NLEA to preclude
state requirements relating to food safety.10 Medical devices are another case in point. Nearly 25 years ago
{ long before FDAMA mandated national uniformity for OTC drugs and cosmetics { Congress enacted the
1976 Medical Device Amendments (\MDA")11 to preempt state requirements dealing with medical devices.12
Even where the FDA has mandated national uniformity in product labels or safety standards, states retain the
power to enforce higher standards through state product liability suits. Signicantly, lawsuits alleging failure-
to-warn are not generally preempted by compliance with uniform, FDA-mandated national standards.13
(f), no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in eect any requirement {
1) that relates to the regulation of a drug that is not subject to the requirements of section 503(b)(1) or 503(f)(1)(A); and
2) that is dierent from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a requirement under this Act, the Poison
Packaging Act of 1970 [15 U.S.C. x 1471 et seq.], or the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act [15 U.S.C. x 1451 et seq.]"
621 U.S.C. x 379(s); FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(a). \In general, [e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), (d), or (e),
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in eect any requirement for labeling or packaging of a
cosmetic that is dierent from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a requirement specically applicable to
a particular cosmetic or class of cosmetics under this Act, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 [15 U.S.C. x 1471 et
seq], or the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act [ 15 U.S.C. x 1451 et seq.]"
7143 Cong. Rec. S8894 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
8Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990); 21 U.S.C. x 343-1.
9See infra pp. 67-68.
10See infra pp. 71-72
11Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 540 (1976).
1221 U.S.C. x 360k. Section 360(k) states: \Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a state may establish or continue in eect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement |
1) which is dierent from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and 2) which relates
to the safety or eectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under the
Act;" see infra 10-12.
13See J. Warren Rissier, The FDA's Proposed Labeling Rules for Over-the-Couner Drugs and Preemption of State Tort Law,
2FDAMA explicitly states that state product liability suits dealing with OTC drugs or cosmetics are not
preempted by the national uniformity provisions.14 The preemption analysis is dierent for medical devices.
Courts have construed the preemption provisions of the MDA to preclude state tort liability for medical
devices; to date, neither the FDA nor Congress has explicitly set the record straight on whether state
court juries should override FDA determinations of safety for medical devices.15 In fact, the FDA recently
withdrew a proposed rule which would have claried that state product liability rules are not preempted by
the MDA.16 Similar to the issue of national uniformity, the question remains as to whether it makes sense to
allow for federal preemption of state tort liability of some FDA-regulated products but not others. As one
U.S. Supreme Court justice asked during the oral argument of Medtronic Inc., v. Lohr,17 \Isn't it odd...that
with an agency that is charged with regulating food, drugs, medical devices, that Congress would create a
regime that ousts State tort remedies for medical devices but not for drugs, not for food, not for cosmetics?
Why would Congress do that?"18
In this paper, I will argue that national uniformity should be granted to all FDA-regulated products and
should include preemption of both state labeling and safety standards as well as state product liability laws.
Cosmetics and food should be treated the same as FDAMA treats OTC drugs. Although the FDA has
developed dierent regulatory regimes for each product, the FDA has established the optimal standards for
all of its products, and states should not interfere to preclude harmonization. Congress should also prevent
71 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (1998).
1421 U.S.C. x 379r; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751(e). For OTC drugs, x 751(e) reads, \No Eect on Product Liability Law
{ Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise aect any action or the liability of any person under the
product liability law of any State;" see also 21 C.F.R. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 752 (d). For cosmetics, x 752(d)
reads, \No Eect on Product Liability Law { Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise aect any action
or the liability of any person under the product liability law of any State."
15See infra pp. 9-12, 38-41.
16Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 39789 (July 24, 1998).
17Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
18Transcript of Oral Arg., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886), available in 1996 WL
207143, at *26. Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard Law School argued on behalf of Metronic, Inc. before the United States
Supreme Court. See id. at *1.
3state courts and lay juries from interfering with the goals of the FDA to both ensure the safety of products,
while at the same time, encourage innovation. The Supreme Court has said, \state regulations can be as
eectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation
to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy."19 Congress needs to recognize that state tort claims impose requirements for safety and eectiveness
that can be just as detrimental to the goals of national uniformity as state labeling and safety standards.20
The benets of national uniformity for FDA-regulated products can never be fully realized if state tort suits
interfere as an additional regulatory tool to monitor safety. FDAMA itself is inherently contradictory, because
the explicit allowance of state tort suits conicts with the Act's goal of national uniformity.21 Manufacturers
are caught in a \physical impossibility,"22 because even if manufacturers comply with nationally uniform
FDA standards, the threat of tort liability results in an incentive to overwarn and to include information
that departs from a uniform FDA standard.23
19Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992), citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959).
20See King v. Collagen, 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir. 1993) (\Appellant's claim would force us to determine that [the
product] is unsafe and dangerous, in opposition to the contrary determination made by the FDA.")
21See Rissier, supra note 13, at 1393-1394.
22See id. \Perhaps the reason why the FDA failed to preempt state tort law is that it failed to recognize the extent to which
compliance with both FDA standards and state tort law is a physical impossibility, and the degree to which state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of eective labeling of OTC drugs and providing for aordable healthcare." Id. (citing
62 Fed. Reg. 9024, 9041 (1997)).
23See id.
4II. The Doctrine of Federal Preemption and the Statutory Com-
pliance Defense
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause necessitates that federal law take precedence over state or local law.24
One commentator dened preemption as \the authority granted to the Congress by the U.S. Constitution to
assume partial or total responsibility for a governmental function, thereby delimiting the roles of the states
and their political subdivisions."25 Since the ratication of the Constitution in 1789, Congress has passed
over 350 statutes preempting state laws.26 Indeed, the increase in the number of elds preempted by the
federal government is staggering. Of the 350 preempted laws, all but 14 had been enacted in the past 100
years, and more than half in the past 30 years.27 The New Deal, the civil rights movement, and consumer
protection have been favored areas of federal preemption.28
Courts have recognized two kinds of preemption: express and implied.29 Express preemption occurs when
Congress clearly indicates that federal law should preempt state regulations.30 Federal agencies can also
establish regulations which preempt state law. For example, in 1986, the FDA expressly preempted state-
imposed requirements on aspirin if the state labeling conicted with the FDA requirements.31 In the absence
of express statutory language, courts may also imply preemption. In implying preemption, courts look to 1)
24See U.S. Const., art. VI., cl.2. The Supremacy Clause provides: \This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in each State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Law of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
25Joseph F. Zimmerman, Federal Preemption: The Silent Revolution 3 (1991).
26See W. John Moore, Stopping the Stones, The National J. (July 21, 1990), at 1758.
27See id.
28See id. For instance, age discrimination acts, and fair housing and voting rights statutes all contained preemption language.
See id. In the consumer protection arena, the federal government has passed statutes establishing federal preemption for air
and water quality, asbestos removal, drug abuse control, hazardous substances, mine safety, nuclear emergency planning, and
cigarette smoking, among others. See id.
29For a detailed discussion of federal preemption, see Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort Awards
by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 Food & Drug L. J. 510-524 (1996).
30See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (local regulations preempted by Federal Meat Inspection
Act).
31See Labeling of Oral and Rectal Over-the-Counter Aspirin and Aspirin Containing Products, Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg.
27,776 (1990); see also Marilyn P. Westereld, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does Congress Want, 58 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 263, 265 (1989).
5the comprehensiveness of federal regulations; 2) the dominant federal interest in the subject matter regulated;
and 3) whether there exists a direct conict between federal and state requirements.32 Courts, however, have
been reluctant to imply preemption, especially for FDA-regulated products.33
Where preemption cannot be raised as a defense, defendants in product liability suits may assert a \statutory
compliance defense." There is a \ne line" between the preemption doctrine and the statutory compliance
defense.34 Manufacturers can assert a preemption defense when a federal agency's regulations supersede all
other laws.35 Manufacturers complying with all federal regulations in a preempted industry are immune
from tort liability.36 In contrast, manufacturers complying with federal regulations in industries where the
preemption defense does not apply will not necessarily be immune from tort liability.37 They will only
be immune if a jury nds them nonnegligent because of their compliance with federal safety standards.38
Courts have been reluctant to allow manufacturers to escape liability under a statutory compliance defense.
In most cases, courts generally view compliance as \evidence of, or at the most a rebuttable presumption of,
nonnegligence regarding the manufacturing or design defects of a product."39 Some states, however, have
32See e.g., Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (refused to imply preemption where
introduce no evidence that county blood centers interfered with federal goals); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947) (discussing the factors that give rise to implied congressional occupation of a particular area); see also Westereld,
supra note 31, at 266-270.
33See, e.g., Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1988) ( \preemption [did] not follow imme-
diately from the comprehensive federal regulation of prescription biological products."); see also David R. Geiger & Mark D.
Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to
Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 395, 407-421 (1996). Courts, however, have implied preemption
in other elds. For instance, in Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961), the Supreme Court said that the Tobacco Inspection
Act preempted state classications for tobacco because the federal statute specically dealt with the subject matter. See id. at
302.
34See Ashley W. Warren, Compliance With Governmental Regulatory Standards: Is It Enough to Immunize a Defendant
from Tort Liability?, 49 Baylor L. Rev. 763, 771 (1997).
35See id. at 772; see also Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
36See Warren, supra note 34, at 772.
37See id.
38See id.
39See id. Courts rst addressed the statutory compliance defense in cases dealing with public safety concerns about govern-
mental regulation of the railroads. See id. at 773. For instance, in Grand Truck Railroad Co., v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892),
the Supreme Court held that railroads could be liable for negligence even if they had complied with federal safety regulations
prescribing the nature and placing of crossing signals, and other precautionary measures, designed to ensure the public safety.
See id. at 420-421. Manufacturers, however, would have a defense against tort liability if there existed no extraordinary haz-
ards. See id. at 421. The Second Restatement of Torts embraced the holding of Ives. See Warren, supra note 34, at 777. The
Restatement states that \[c]ompliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a nding
of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions." Restatement (Second) of Torts, x288 (C) (1965).
6modied the common law by enacting statutes that create a presumption that regulatory compliance suces
to establish a defendant's \due care."40 Other states have statutes that bar punitive damages awards against
manufacturers complying with FDA requirements.41
Courts have generally refused to apply the statutory compliance defense for FDA-regulated products. Ju-
ries have overridden the scientic determination of the FDA and found government-mandated warnings to
be inadequate, thereby causing manufacturers to change their labeling.42 For instance, in MacDonald v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,43 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a verdict for the plainti,
and held that an FDA warning on an oral contraceptive drug was inadequate even though the manufacturer
had furnished a detailed description of the drug's risk of abnormal clotting associated with the use of the
pill.44 Courts have also imposed liability on manufacturers even where the FDA said that a warning was
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, states: \Compliance with a safety statute is relevant and admissible
with regard to whether the defendant met the applicable tort standard of care, but is not dispositive." Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, section 7(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
40See Warren, supra note 34, at 781-782. For example, the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 states the following:
\Compliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statute or administrative regulation existing at the time a
product was manufactured and prescribing standards for design, inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning or instruc-
tions for use of a product, shall raise a rebuttable presumption that the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition
in regard to matters covered by these standards." Tenn. Code. Ann. x 29-28-104 (1980 & Supp. 1995); see also Mich. Stat.
Ann. x 27A.2946(5) (Law. Co-op 1996) (tort actions against drug manufacturers complying with FDA regulations are allowed
only if the company has intentionaly withheld or misrepresented information to the FDA, or bribed FDA ocials.) Compare
with Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. x 7.72.050(1)(1992), which states, \Evidence...that the product was or was not, in compli-
ance...with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory standards, whether relating to design, construction or
performance of the product or to warnings or instructions as to its use may be considered by the trier of fact." Id.
41See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. x 2A:58C-5(c) (1987); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. x 2307.80 (1988); Or. Rev. Stat. x 30.927
(1987). The U.S. House of Representatives also passed a bill which would bar punitive damages for manufacturers complying
with FDA regulations, but would allow awards in cases of intentional failure to report or in cases of bribery. See H.R. 956,
x 201(f), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 315 (1997).
42See John F. Del Giorno, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Over-
dosing on State Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 629, 630 (1989).
43MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
44See id. at 67, n. 4. The FDA regulations labeled the pill with a warning that \oral contraceptives are powerful and eective
drugs that can cause side eects in some users and should not be used at all by some women," and that \[t]he most serious
known side eect is abnormal blood clotting that can be fatal." Id. at 66 & n. 3 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 9002-9003 (1970)).
The warning did not use the word \stroke" in describing the abnormal blood clotting. The plainti suered a stroke as a result
of taking the pill and was allowed to recover. See id. at 70-71. The court said the warning was inadequate because it was not
\comprehensible to the average consumer" or because it should have warned of both the risk of permanent disability as well as
death. Id. at 71-72; After the plainti's injury, but prior to trial, the FDA revised the warning to require that the label warn
of strokes. See id. at 67, n. 6 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 4221 (1978)); see also Frederick C. Schafrick, Product Liability Suits For
Failure to Warn of the Hazards of Regulated Products, 32 Tort & Ins. L. J. 833 (1997) (pages not available).
7unnecessary.45 For example, the 11th Circuit held a defendant liable when it deferred to an FDA deter-
mination that it need not include an unsubstantiated warning detailing the link between spermicide and
birth defects.46 In another example, a Kansas court awarded $2.75 million in punitive damages against a
manufacturer who failed to warn of kidney disease, even though the FDA had explicitly rejected the request
by another manufacturer to amend its labeling to warn of that precise risk.47
As a consequence of weak federal preemption and the refusal of courts to recognize a statutory compliance
defense, except where granted by statute, manufacturers typically face two dierent types of regulation: 1)
liability in tort and 2) regulation of safety standards by the FDA and/or state legislatures or agencies.48
State product liability claims are divided into three parts: failure-to-warn claims, manufacturing defect
claims and design defect claims.49 Under most state's tort laws, manufacturers can be held liable in both
negligence and strict liability for failing to warn of a product's hazards.50 To safeguard themselves against
liability, manufacturers generally must take reasonable measures to inform users of dangers associated with
the product, usually by issuing warning labels.51 Federal and state regulatory law also generally require
manufacturers to warn consumers of the hazards associated with regulatory products.52
With a rise in product liability actions and increased federal and state legislative regulation, manufacturers
45See Schafrick, supra note 44.
46Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985). The court found that the evidence linking spermicide and
birth defects was \so insubstantial" that no warning was required. See id. at 746; see also Schafrick, supra note 44.
47Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984).
48See Warren, supra note 34, at 779.
49See Page Keeton et. Al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, x99, at 685-88, x99, at 697-98 (5th ed. 1984).
50See Schafrick, supra note 44; Prosser, supra note 49, at x96. Most pharmaceutical cases involve failure-to-warn claims.
See Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42
St. Louis L. J. 163, 168 (1998). Since the FDA prescribes good manufacturing processes, and since drugs cannot be designed
in an alternative fashion, tort cases involving manufacturing defects or design defects are rare. See id. Under a negligence
theory, manufacturers have a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform users of potential dangers associated with the probable
uses of the product if the manufacturer 1) knows or should know of those dangers, and 2) has no reason to believe that an
ordinary user will know of them. Keeton, supra note 49, x96, at 685. Manufacturers, however, have no duty to warn of dangers
which would be obvious to an ordinary user, or dangers experts could not have reasonably foreseen. See Schafrick, supra note
44. A manufacturer's duties under strict liability are nearly the same as under negligence. However, under negligence, \one
determines whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in selling the product with whatever warnings accompanied it; under
strict liability, one determines whether the product was defective in light of the warnings that accompanied it." Id.
51See Schafrick, supra note 44.
52See id. An example is the Federal Cigarette and Advertising Act which requires cigarette packages to bear specic warnings
about health hazards associated with smoking. 15 U.S.C. xx 1331-1341 (1994).
8began to call for change. The rst such change came indirectly, as courts reversed direction and began to
expansively construe congressional intent to preempt state requirements.53 Starting in the 1980s, courts
began to use the preemption language of federal consumer protection laws to extend federal preemption
to state product liability laws.54 In the 1992 case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.,55 the Supreme Court
signaled a broad use of the preemption defense to bar state product liability actions. The 1969 Cigarette
Labeling Act stated, \No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act."56 In interpreting the Act and writing for a plurality of four,
Justice Stevens concluded that the phrase \requirement or prohibition...imposed under State law," could
refer to both positive legislative enactments and to state tort actions.57 Cipollone provided a \springboard"
for courts to hold consumer's claimed preempted under other statutes.58 Most signicantly, courts began to
construe Cipollone expansively and to apply its broad reasoning to the provisions of the MDA as preempting
state tort suits dealing with medical devices.59
53See Lars Noah, Amplication of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 Food & Drug L.J. 183, 183 (1994)
(\T]he medical device industry has beneted from a gradual evolution of case law aording even greater preemption eect to
requirements of the Food and Drug Administration. To be sure, devices alone among FDA-regulated products are the subject
of an express statutory preemption clause, but that cannot by itself account for the very dierent trajectories of preemption
defenses in drug and device cases.")
54See Robert B. Lear & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After
Medtronic, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 691, 747 (1997).
55Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). For a detailed discussion of the case, see Carrier, supra note 29, at
535-547.
56Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, as amended, 15 U.S.C. xx1331-1340, at x5(b).
57Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522.
58See Lear, supra note 54, at 698.
59A proposed FDA rule stated that it was not until after Cipollone that \lower courts interpreted [the MDA]...to preempt
tort actions respecting allegedly defective medical devices...based on State common law." 62 Fed. Reg. 65385 (1997). See,
e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1993) (nding that because the manufacturer had received the
FDA's premarket approval for a wrinkle cream treatment, the claim was preempted within the meaning of x 360k of the MDA);
Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993) (FDA's premarket approval process and post-approval regulatory
powers preempted state liability suit); Tallbott v. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) (Manufacturer immunized from
tort liability even where manufacturer admittedly and intentionally had violated provisions of federal law to ensure safety and
ecacy of medical devices). Prior to Medtronic, only one federal court held that the MDA did not preempt state tort actions.
See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of other cases in which courts have
interpreted the MDA provisions of the MDA prior to Medtronic, see Gary L. Wilson, Listen to the FDA: The Medical Device
Amendments Do Not Preempt Tort Law, 19 Hamline L. Rev. 409 (1996) (\The Preemption Jurisprudence is a Mess.") Id. at
416; Noah, supra note 53, at 190-200.
9In 1996, the Supreme Court appeared to stop the trend of Cipollone to imply federal preemption of state
tort suits.60 In Medtronic v. Lohr,61 the plainti alleged that Medtronic, the manufacturer of a cardiac
pacemaker, failed to warn her physician of the device's tendency to fail in life-threatening situations, despite
the manufacturer's knowledge of defects.62 Medtronic claimed that the plainti's suit was barred by x 360k
of the MDA, which states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a state may
establish or continue in eect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement
| 1) which is dierent from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to
the device, and 2) which relates to the safety or eectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under the Act.63
The Court held that the state product liability claim over the defective pacemaker was not preempted
by x 360k(a) of the MDA.64 In order to be preempted, the Court reasoned, the FDA requirements must
be \specic counterpart regulations...applicable to a particular device,"65 and that the preempted state
requirements not be \of general applicability."66 At issue in Medtronic were federal labeling requirements
that required in warning labels \information for use...and any relevant hazards, contraindications, side
eects, and precautions."67 The product had undergone the x 510 (k) review process in which a manufacturer
noties FDA that a device is \substantially equivalent" to an existing device, thereby bypassing FDA review
of the full safety and eectiveness of the device.68 For the pacemaker, preemption failed because the federal
60Since Medtronic, Congress has been reluctant to impose sweeping federal preemption of state product liability laws. For
example, the Proposed Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. (1997), would have preempted state tort law
in certain ways but would have left the \core" of state civil remedies intact. See Lear, supra note 54, at 748, n. 4; H.R. 956,
104th Cong. x102(b) (1996) (discussed in Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform: A Warning
Not Heeded, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 663 (1997)). A preemption change similar to Cipollone would have \attacked the core itself, by
completing foreclosing many types of claims for entire categories of regulated products." Lear, supra note 54, at 748, n. 4.
61For a detailed discussion of Medtronic, see Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the \Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A Divided Court
Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1440 (1997).
62Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2248.
64Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2259.
6521 C.F.R. x 808.1(d).
6621 C.F.R. x 808.1(d)(1). In order to be candidates for preemption, state requirements must be 1) developed \with respect
to medical devices"; 2) specic in terms of applicability, thereby saving from preemption state requirements of \general applica-
bility," ; 3) \dierent from or in addition to `federal requirements"'; and 4) concerned with safety, ecacy, or any other matter
included in a federal requirement that applies to the device." Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2257.
6721 C.F.R. x 801.109(c) (1996).
68Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2258.
10labeling and manufacturing requirements were not designed with the specic device in mind, and the state
tort law duties were not device-specic.69 The Court's decision is consistent with both legislative history
and FDA interpretation. The legislative history of MDA was \devoid" of any mention of state tort suits as a
basis for preemption,70 and the FDA had taken a \restrictive" interpretation of the preemption provision.71
III. The Need for National Uniformity and Federal Preemption of State Product Liability
Actions
Congress' position on the preemption of state laws dealing with labeling, safety, and tort suits lacks coherence
and consistency. FDAMA preempts state regulation of OTC labeling and safety standards, but only preempts
state labeling requirements for cosmetics. States can fully regulate food safety standards, but the federal
government exclusively regulates most food labeling. Plaintis currently are free to pursue products liability
actions for failing-to-warn for drugs, foods, and cosmetics, but it is unclear whether there is any preemption
for tort suits involving medical devices. The National Childhood Vaccination Injury Act (\NCVI") appears
69Id.
70See Lear, supra note 54, at 704; see also H.Rep. No. 94-853, at 45-46 (1976). Lear notes that the absence of any mention
of preemption of state tort suits is \unsurprising," given the fact that at the time of the MDA's enactment, the \near-universal"
rule was that compliance with regulatory standards could only constitute evidence of due care or nondefectiveness in tort
actions. Id. at 704. Lear also indicates that the MDA also contains a limited savings clause which indicates that preemption
of state tort suits was \not part of the congressional design" in enacting the MDA. Id. at 706. The MDA authorizes the FDA to
issue orders requiring manufacturers and distributors to notify doctors and patients about medical devices with an unreasonable
risk of harm. See 21 U.S.C. x360h(a), (b) (1994), as cited in Lear, supra note 54, at 706. The section continues and says,
\Compliance with an order issued under this section shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law." Id.
at x 360h(d).
71See Lear, supra note 54, at 706. 21 C.F.R. xx 808.1(d) says that state and local requirements of general applicability are not
preempted, but a state's \substantive requirement for a specic device" might be preempted only if the FDA had established a
\specic counterpart regulations or...other specic requirements applicable to a particular device." Id. The FDA also submitted
an amicus brief in Medtronic. The agency explained that it had consistently construed the term \requirement" to refer to
substantive rather than remedial measures. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents/Cross-
Petitioners, Metronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996), Nos. 95-754, 95-886 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1996), 1996 WL 118035, at
*13; see also Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 Food and Drug L. J. 7, 10 (1997)
(\The agency's position was adopted by the Supreme Court in Lohr. The Court accepted FDA's narrow construction of the
scope of section 521, reasoning that a nding of broad preemption would be entirely at odds with Congress' intend in enacting
the MDA."). For an analysis of the weight courts should give to FDA's conclusions about the preemptive eect of the FDCA,
see Amanda Frost, Judicial Review of FDA Preemption Determinations, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 367 (1999).
11to almost require that state law tort remedies be available to injured users of vaccines.72 Is there any
rationale for the disparity? Is FDA regulation so lax in some elds that states need to supplement federal
safety standards, either through positive legislative enactments or state tort suits? Are there some areas in
which lay juries are more competent than the FDA to place liability on manufacturers who have complied
with FDA requirements? Are cigarettes73 and pesticides74 more worthy of preemption than FDA-regulated
products?
72See Geiger, supra note 33, at 406; 42 U.S.C. x 300aa-22(e). The NCVI Act does have a preemption provision which states,
No State may establish or enforce a law which prohibits an individual from bringing a civil action against a vaccine manufacturer
for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death if such civil action is not barred by this part." Id. Geiger argues that \the
eect of the NCVI Act's express preemption provision is to prohibit states from eliminating the applicability of their own tort
and contract laws vis- a-vis victims of vaccines." Geiger, supra note 33, at 406.
73See Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); see supra p. 9-10. In Cipollone, the Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act preempted a state court tort action for failing to warn of the dangers of smoking cigarettes. See also
Del Giorno, supra note 42, at 642. (\The court's willingness to nd a dominant national interest in the context of cigarette
smoking, but not for prescription drugs, is astonishing.")
74See The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which expressly preempts any state statutory enactment that
purports to regulate labeling or packaging on pesticides. 7 U.S.C. x 136v(b) (1994). FIFRA, however, does not expressly
preempt state tort law, but has been held by some courts to impliedly preempt state tort law, even though its regulations are
less comprehensive than those of the FDA. See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959
F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that FIFRA impliedly preempted failure-to-warn-claim). For more information on FIRFA,
see, e.g., Carrier, supra note 29, at 600-609; Celeste Marie Steen, FIRFA's Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions Involving
Genetically Engineered Pesticides, 38 Ariz. l. Rev. 763 (1996); Stephen D. Otero, The Case Against FIRFA Preemption:
Reconciling Cipollone's Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions of Federalism, 36 Wm. &
Mary L. R. 783 (1995).
12Although a dierent regulatory regime monitors each product, all
four industries { drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and food - are
undergoing changes which should mandate national uniformity for
labeling and safety standards and should allow for the preemption
of state product liability actions. As indicated by the legislative
history of FDAMA:
Dierent or additional requirements at the State or local level can
work against our national marketplace, confuse consumers, raise
prices, undermine public condence in our regulatory system and
in products important to public health, and result in divergent
public health protection throughout the country.75
From as early as 1894, states have clamored for national unifor-
mity in food and drug laws. In 1894, the Association of Ocial
Agricultural Chemists wrote in its constitution that its objectives
\were to secure, as far as possible, uniformity in legislation...and
uniformity and accuracy in the methods and results [of analysis.]"76
In 1897, representatives from ten states met to establish uniform
laws.77 The resulting organization { the Association of Food and
Drug Ocials { still has as its principal aim the establishment of
uniform food and drug laws.78 Congress has also tried but failed to
establish national uniformity. In 1988, a bill was introduced in the
Senate to mandate national uniformity in all aspects of the regula-
tion of food for human use, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics.79
In 1991, the Edwards Committee called for the \national unifor-
mity" of all products regulated by the FDA, with states being able
to seek preemption with convincing local circumstances.80 Indeed,
the Committee felt that national uniformity was so necessary that
it recommended that if Congress had not enacted such legislation
by the close of session of the 102nd Congress, the FDA should issue
regulations accomplishing the same goals.81
National uniformity will have added benets to both consumers and to manufacturers. There are generally
four areas of food and drug regulation: 1) environmental sanitation; 2) safety standards; 3) economic reg-
75S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna & Cuneo, ed.
1998), at 344.
76K. Helrich, The Great Collaboration: The First One Hundred Years of the Association of Ocial Analytical Chemists 9
(1984), as cited in Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 987 (1991).
77See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 75, at 987.
78See National Uniformity Proposal by GMA Will Accommodate Many Concerns of State Ocials, Food Chemical News, June
16, 1997. (\[N]ational uniformity through cooperation is the stated purpose of the Association of Food and Drug Ocials...")
79S. 2468, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Title VII of the bill would have prohibited states from establishing or continuing in
eect any requirement relating to the regulation of any drug unless the state requirement was identical to that established by
13ulation; and 4) composition and standardization.82 H. Thomas Austern argues that while states may be
best as safeguarding environmental sanitation, the federal government is more eective at regulating safety
standards, and in ensuring the highest degree of economic regulation.83 States do not have the resources
to adequately test products, and economies of scale dictate that the free movement of goods is best accom-
plished by uniform standards and labeling.84 Austern also argues that while the issue of whether the states
or the federal government should establish standardization is \the most discomforting area of chaos and
perhaps plain rivalry," the decision should tilt in favor of the federal government, provided it develops more
responsive mechanisms for consideration and consultation of state views.85 FDAMA, for instance, does just
that, by providing exemption provisions which allow individual states to petition the FDA to make a state
idea a national requirement if circumstances warrant; FDAMA also has provisions allowing states to act in
emergency situations.86
the FDA or the state had obtained an exemption; As Westereld notes, \The failure of [Title VII] to even reach the Senate
bill exemplies a congressional uneasiness with permitting a federal agency to override state law, particularly in the area of the
health and safety of citizens." Westereld, supra note 31, at 281.
80See Department of Health and Human Servs., Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Food and Drug Administration
50 (1991); see also Mark B. Gelbert, State Statutes Aecting the Labeling of OTC Drugs: Constitutionality Based on Commerce
Clause and Federal Preemption Theories, 46 Food, Drug & Cosm. J. 629, 661 (1991); 143 Cong. rec. S8890 (Sept. 8, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Gregg).
81See Department of Health and Human Servs., Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration; see also Gelbert, supra note 80, at 661.
82See H. Thomas Austern, Federalism In Consumer Protection: Conict or Coordination?, 29 Bulletin of the Ass'n of
Food and Drug Officials of the U.S., No. 4, at 148 (1965), in Hutt & Merrill, supra note 75, at 992-993.
83See id.
84See id.
85Id. As Austern writes, \It is not too much to hope that in this area of economic control over composition of food products,
the States will yield to Federal standardization, and at the same time that the FDA will develop better and more responsive
mechanisms for consultation and consideration of the views of State ocials..." Id.
8621 U.S.C. x 379(r); FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751; 21 U.S.C. 379(s); FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(b).
14National uniformity assures consumers that one federal agency will
monitor the safety of its products for all citizens. National unifor-
mity needs to be adopted to level out the playing eld. As Senator
Jeords said during the congressional debates on FDAMA, small
states often do not have the resources to conduct comprehensive
testing of products and to pass legislature in response to damaging
results.87 Since \[i]f a food, drug, or cosmetic is safe in one state, it
is safe in all states,"88 there appears to be no rationale for allowing
large states to protect their citizens more than smaller states. The
FDA is in a much better position than the individual states to mea-
sure the safety and ecacy of products, as it is a simply a waste of
resources to have 51 dierent regulatory agencies doing the same
work as the FDA.89 National uniformity is also needed to ensure
that safety { rather than politics { governs regulation. Regulation
of foods, drugs, and cosmetics has been an \attractive target" for
local legislators to appeal to local industries and to protect local
markets.90 In fact, states often regulate the environment under the
guise of cosmetics regulation.91
Yet, at the same time, Congress should recognize that if the United States truly wishes to reap the benets
derived from national uniformity, it must resolve the inconsistency that currently exists by the allowance of
tort suits. Requiring national uniformity is akin to a \federal dictate,"92 and FDAMA, by simultaneously re-
87143 Cong. rec.S8894 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
88Hearings on H.R. 3200 Food Amendments and the Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996 Before the Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment, 103rd Cong. (May 1, 1996) (statement of Peter Barton Hutt on behalf of the Grocery Manufacturers
Association of America and the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association).
89See Gelbert, supra note 80, at 658.
90Hearings on H.R. 3200 Food Amendments and the Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996 Before the Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment, 103rd Cong. (May 1, 1996) (statement of Peter Barton Hutt on behalf of the Grocery Manufacturers
Association of America and the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association).
91See infra pp. 48-50.
92Lear, supra note 54, at 713. \A federal dictate...necessarily carries with it the implication that the aspect of the product
to which the dictate refers is in compliance with the law, and that any variance is not to be tolerated. A contrary state-law
jury nding would be incompatible with the Supremacy Clause." Id.
15quiring national uniformity while allowing state tort actions to proceed, is forcing manufacturers into a catch
22 { a \regulatory compliance trap" in which noncompliance with federal regulations creates a presump-
tion of negligence, but compliance would not negate liability.93 In the past, where the FDA has mandated
uniform labeling standards, courts have sometimes preempted state tort actions seeking to impose higher
standards on manufacturers.94 The FDA's regulation of tampons provides the most vivid example. FDA reg-
ulations specify that tampon labels must contain information relating to tampon absorbency and the risk of
toxic shock syndrome.95 Courts addressing failure-to-warn claims of tampons have held that failure-to-warn
claims alleging defective labeling are preempted by compliance with these FDA regulations.96 Now, with the
explicit disallowance of state tort suits for cosmetics and OTC drugs,97 courts will no longer have the luxury
to resolve the inconsistency on their own by allowing strict FDA regulations to preempt state standards.
Consequently, allowing the jury to determine that a federally-approved and nationally uniform warning is
inadequate { which is what happens when juries rule in favor of plaintis { stands \as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress in its regulation of labeling."98 Benets
gained from national uniformity will be compromised by tort suits. Uniform labeling will directly conict
with the manufacturer's desire to include more information to deect tort suits on failure-to-warn. Large
damage awards contradict the low prices occurring as a result of less burdened regulation by the states.
The pressing need for the globalization of food, drug, and cosmetic regulation adds to the tension. Global-
ization of the pharmaceutical, cosmetic, and food industries makes national uniformity almost inevitable.99
93Thomas M. Moore & Siobhan A. Cullen, Impact of Global Pharmaceutical Regulations on U.S. Products Liability Exposure,
66 Def. Couns. J. 101, 101 (1999).
94See Lear, supra note 54, at 731-732.
9521 C.F.R. x 801.430.
96See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure-to-warn claim
preempted; testing, design, and manufacturing claims permitted); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.
1989) (same).
9721 U.S.C. x 379r; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751(e); 21 C.F.R. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 752(d); see supra
footnote 14.
98Jennie Clarke, Federal Preemption: A Vaccine Manufacturer's Defense, 56 Mo. L. Rev. 515, 536 (1988).
99As Peter Barton Hutt said, \National uniformity { which requires internal harmonization of our own laws and regulations
{ is an integral part of international harmonization." Hearings on H.R. 3200 Food Amendments and the Animal Drug Avail-
16The mounting trend toward globalization will force nations to alter their existing regulatory regimes.100 For
instance, the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use represents an attempt to harmonize the scientic requirements of the pharmaceutical regula-
tory agencies in the United States, Japan, and Europe \in order to speed up the time from developing to
marketing of new drugs."101 The Codex Alimentarius Commission has pursued a similar eort for the food
industry.102 FDAMA also adopted this spirit of global harmonization. Section 410 of FDAMA declares
that the FDA should support the negotiation of mutual recognition agreements on international regulatory
harmonization regarding drugs, biological products, devices, foods, food additives, color additives, and good
manufacturing processes if participation would be consistent with the FDA's goal of consumer protection.103
The increased globalization of standards, product development, and marketing has sparked a \new and
potentially dangerous twist to the regulatory compliance trap."104 Globalization increases the number of
regulatory regimes manufacturers are subject to. Consequently, the products liability exposure of U.S. cor-
porations increases, since plaintis' counsel often point to dierences in product design and labeling on
U.S. products in foreign countries as evidence of \defectiveness" in products sold in the United States.105
Inquiries by foreign agencies can also be used as evidence of liability or causation in torts suits.106 Increased
exposure to products liability suits is only exacerbated by the fact that an increasing number of pharmaceu-
ability Act of 1996 Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, 103rd Cong. (May 1, 1996) (statement of Peter
Barton Hutt on behalf of the Grocery Manufacturers Association of America and the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Asso-
ciation); see also Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 692, 693 (1998)
(\[Globalization] trends have compelled FDA, as well as the industries it regulates,...to rethink their international strategy.")
100See John S. Eldred & Shirley A. Coeld, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs to Know: Realizing the Impact of
Globalization on National Food Regulation, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 31, 37 (1997).
101Moore, supra note 93, at 107; see also Horton, supra note 99.
102See Eldred & Coeld, supra note 102. The Codex has 151 member countries and is a subsidiary body of two United
Nations organizations, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. See id. at 31-32. \The
Codex develops a model international approach to food legislation, but does not require harmonization." Id. at 33; see also
Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulations in the European Union and the United States: Dierent Cultures, Dierent Laws,
4 Colum. L. Eur. L. 525 (1998); Linda R. Horton, International Harmonization of Food and Veterinary Medicine Products,
in The Fundamentals of Law and REgulation 381-484 ( Robert E. Brady et al. ed. 1997).
10321 U.S.C. x 383; FDAMA x 410.
104Moore, supra note 93, at 101. For a discussion of the drug approval process in both the European Union and Japan, see
id. at 102-105.
105See id. at 102.
106See id.
17tical, medical device, and cosmetics companies are owned outside the United States; these companies may
also have subsidiaries worldwide.107
The FDA is now at a crossroads. Faced with the benets derived from national uniformity of product regula-
tion and an increased pressure to harmonize standards internationally, FDAMA represents a needed rst step
to achieving these goals. The question remains, however, whether only some FDA-regulated products should
enjoy national uniformity. The premise of this paper is that all of the products regulated by the FDA should
share equally in beneting from national uniformity provisions. A second question arises when one ponders
whether national uniformity should only apply to positive state legislative enactments or whether it should
also apply to the more indirect way states regulate through tort law. The argument in this paper is that the
benets of national uniformity derived by preempting positive legislative enactments will be compromised
by allowing states to continue to regulate through their judicial system. The following sections will address
each FDA-regulated product in turn to explain why preemption of both positive legislative enactments and
state tort law should be granted.
IV. DRUGS
A.
History of Drug Regulation
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906108 was Congress' rst successful attempt to regulate the ever-growing
national scope of the nation's food and drug supply. The original act banned the manufacture and distribution
107See id. at 106.
108Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
18of adulterated109 and misbranded food and drugs;110 it also forbid false and misleading labeling of foods and
drugs concerning the identity and composition of the product.111 The 1906 Act, however, was notably weak.
The Act did not extend its coverage to cosmetics or medical devices, and it did not provide for premarket
testing for drug safety.112 In order to be subject to the Act's seizure or criminal penalties, potential violators
had to place an adulterated or misbranded item into interstate commerce.113 The Act also did not create
liability for false statements about the therapeutic eects of a drug.114
The rise of the post-New Deal administrative state and frightening drug scares prompted Congress to dra-
matically strengthen the powers of the FDA under the 1906 Act. The death of over one hundred people
who took the drug Elixir Sulfanilamide prompted the FDA to include in the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (\FDCA") safety reviews of drugs before entering commercial distribution.115 FDA enforcement powers
were also enhanced. In 1962, Congress acted to dramatically change the drug approval process. The 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments required the FDA to ensure that a drug was both safe and eective for the
purposes it was intended to be used.116 Congress also expanded the reach of FDA authority, as the amend-
ments required pharmaceutical manufacturers to get FDA approval to both market a drug and to begin
10921 U.S.C. x 331(a); FDCA x 301(a). The federal FDCA prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce any drug or device that is adulterated. Id. The Act denes adulterated drugs and devices to include those that did
not proceed through the appropriate premarket regulatory process. See 21 U.S.C. x 351(a)(2)(B).
11021 U.S.C. x 352(j); FDCA x 502. A drug is deemed misbranded if \it is dangerous to health when used...with the frequency
or duration prescribed, recommended or suggested in the labeling."
11121 U.S.C. x 352(a); FDCA x 502(a). A drug is misbranded under the FDCA if it fails to bear the statements required
by the FDCA or its labeling is false or misleading \in any particular." The government has the burden to establish that a
label is false or misleading { it need not \conscious fraud" motivated the wording on the label. United States v. Articles of
Drug...Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (S.D.N.X. 1978). See also Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the
Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certication and Tort Reform, 48 Rutgers
L. Rev. 883, 890 (1996).
112See Walsh, supra note 111, at 890.
113See id. 21 U.S.C. x 331(a); FDCA x 301(a).
114See Walsh, supra note 111, at 890.
115The primary purpose of the FDCA was to protect the health and safety of the public by preventing deleterious, adulterated,
or misbranded articles from entering interstate commerce. See Erica L. Niezgoda & Maureen M. Richardson, Federal Food and
Drug Act Violations, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 767, 767 (1998).
11621 U.S.C. x 321(p)(2).
19clinical testing.117
In 1951, the Durham-Humphrey Amendments118 to FDCA codied FDA regulations that developed a clas-
sied system for drugs: drugs that could not be used without medical supervision (prescription drugs), and
drugs which could be marketed over-the-counter.119 In 1972, FDA began the process of reviewing all OTC
drugs on the market, a market where there were approximately 500,000 OTC drug products comprising 200
dierent active ingredients.120 Rather than review the safety and ecacy of each individual drug, the FDA
took the approach of studying \active ingredients" and classifying drugs into categories.121
The 1962 Amendments granted the FDA new powers. The FDA could now regulate drug advertising and
promotional activities.122 FDA ocials could inspect drug manufacturing facilities and promulgate regula-
tions governing good manufacturing practices for drugs.123 The 1962 Amendments also signaled the \FDA's
rst attempt at post-market surveillance of drugs for safety," as drug manufacturers had to notify the FDA
of adverse reactions to pharmaceuticals.124 The 1962 amendments mandated that OTC drugs meet the
FDA's eectiveness standards for new drugs, including those approved from 1938-1962.125
The FDA also species requirements for drug labeling. FDA regulations require that labels on drugs not
be false or misleading, that they bear adequate directions for use, and contain warnings against unsafe use,
11721 U.S.C. x 321(p): FDCA x 355. Review of safety data applied both to new drugs and to drugs approved by the FDA
prior to the amendments. In order to handle the workload, the FDA contracted with the National Academy of Science-National
Research Council, which recommended ecacy classications over which the FDA exercised great deference. See Walsh, supra
note 111, at 899.
118Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951); see also James F. Hoge, The Durham-Humphrey Bill, 6 Food Drug Cosm. L.
J. 135 (1951).
119The amendments said that a drug may only be dispensed for prescription use if 1) it is habit forming; 2) because of its
toxicity...it is not safe for use except under supervision; and 3) it is limited to prescription use by an approved application. 21
U.S.C. x 353(b). For an overview of the history of OTC drug regulation, see Stan Stringer, What Has Been Happening with
Over-The-Counter Drug Regulation, 53 Food & Drug L. J. 663 (1998).
120See Gelbert, supra note 80, at 631-632.
121See id.
12221 U.S.C. x 301; FDCA x 392.
12321 U.S.C. x 351(a)(2)(B); FDCA x 501(a)(2)(B). A drug is deemed adulterated if the facilities, controls, and manufacturing,
processing, packing and storage methods under which it is produced to good manufacturing processes.
124See Walsh, supra note 111, at 902.
125See id. at 902.
20side eects, and adverse reactions.126 The FDA employs a risk-benet analysis in writing labels, and only
warns consumers of adverse reactions if there is \signicant medical evidence of a possible health hazard."127
The FDA does not warn consumers of adverse reactions where dierences of opinions within the medical
community exist.128 In recent years, OTC drugs have surged, fueled by prescription to OTC drug switches,
making the need for accurate and complete labeling ever more present.129 As Representative Waxman
stated, \[n]owhere is the need for information greater than when consumers act as their own doctors and
nurses...The signicance of the OTC industry's communications with consumers, and the scrutiny they
currently receive, will only increase..."130
B. State Regulations of Drugs
Despite extensive FDA regulation of OTC drugs, states have taken on a greater role in issuing legislation
that is more protective than federal legislation. States have attempted to require certain language and la-
bel warnings on OTC drugs that \add additional, inconsistent, and confusing precautions to these labels,
in addition to the lengthy and comprehensive labeling requirements imposed by the FDA."131 In fact, the
Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association has stated that almost every state legislature has proposed
statutes that would conict with FDA regulations.132 Examples abound. In 1993, three states sought to
require bittering agents in certain OTC medicines to deter childhood poisonings and overdoses. However,
Congress rejected this solution, and said that child resistant packaging and consumer education were a
12621 U.S.C. x 352(a); 21 C.F.R. x 201.6. See Gelbert, supra note 80, at 634-635.
127Rissier, supra note 13, at 1391.
128See id.
129See Daniel W. Whitney, Product Liability Issues for the Expanding OTC Drug Category, 48 Food & Drug L. J. 321
(1993).
130H.A. Waxman, Self-Care: The Legislative Perspective: Remarks at the FDA's and the Proprietary Association's seminar,
\Self-Care/Self-Medication in America's Future," Washington D.C. (Feb. 8, 1988), as cited in Gelbert, supra note 80, at 634.
131143 Cong. rec. S9846 (Sept. 24, 1997) (Attachment: Examples of State Proposals That Would Disrupt National
Uniformity).
132See Nonprescription Drug Manufacturer's Association, National Regulatory Uniformity (visited March 6, 2000) <
http://ndmainfo.org/facts/factsFrame.html>.
21better means to address the problem.133 In the 1990s, at least 15 states considered legislation requiring
\environmentally-friendly packaging" of OTC drugs.134 Such regulation, however, would have directly con-
icted with the FDA's safety requirements that certain drugs be packaged only in \virgin" materials to
prevent adulteration.135
The FDA has made some attempt to combat the problem of increased state regulation by issuing federal
regulations that explicitly preempt state product warning labels on certain OTC drugs. The FDA included
specic preemption provisions in their regulation of tampering and pregnancy warnings on OTC drugs.136
In response to a rise in product tamperings, the FDA issued a Final Rule on Tamper-Resistant Packaging
Requirements for Over-the-Counter Human Drug and Cosmetic Products, which required that most OTC
products for retail sale be packaged in tamper-resistant packages.137 The TRP rule also explicitly preempted
state and local packaging requirements not identical to the federal regulations.138 In 1982, the FDA followed
the lead of California and required a pregnancy warning on all OTC drugs, which stated, \As with any drug,
if you are pregnant or nursing a baby, seek the advice of a health professional before using this product."139
In order to eliminate confusion and to create, \clear, unambiguous, and consistent" information, state
requirements regarding pregnancy warnings were preempted.140
C. Enactment of FDAMA
133143 Cong. rec. S9846 (Sept. 24, 1997) (Attachment: Examples of State Proposals That Would Disrupt National
Uniformity).
134See id.
135See id.
136See Biana I. Truitt, Injured Consumers and the FDA, 15 J. Legal Med. 170-172 (1994).
137The regulation stated that the \FDA intends that the regulations issued in this document preempt State and local packaging
requirements that are not identical to it with respect to oral and rectal OTC aspirin-containing drug products for human use."
21 C.F.R. x 211.132.
138See id.
13921 C.F.R. xx 201.63(a), 330.2.
140Id.
22Congress responded to the increased state regulation of drugs by enacting x 412(a) of FDAMA.141 FDAMA
preempts state requirements dealing with the safety and labeling of OTC drugs, including requirements
imposed on product manufacture or composition, advertising, or any other form of public notication or
communication.142 States, however, retain signicant powers. Most signicantly, states retain the power to
enforce additional standards through state product liability suits.143 While forms of public notication or
communication must be identical to federal requirements, states may issue their own state warnings about
OTC drugs.144 States retain their enforcement authority to take immediate action against an OTC drug
that was adulterated, or misbranded, and may use compliance powers identical to or dierent from federal
mechanisms.145 Under FDAMA, states would also retain the power to take action in an emergency situation
without consultation by the FDA, such as for a local outbreak, and may place a drug on prescription-only
status.146 FDAMA also explicitly authorizes states to petition for exemptions where a local requirement
may protect a public interest, the local requirement would not cause the OTC drug to be in violation of
federal law, and the local requirement would not unduly burden interstate commerce.147 States can also
petition the FDA to make a state requirement a national one.148
D. The Need for National Uniformity for Drugs
FDAMA is a needed step in the right direction. The FDA suers under two competing pressures. As stated
14121 U.S.C. x379r; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751(a).
142Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA
(McKenna & Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 344.
14321 U.S.C. x379r; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751(e).
144See S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna &
Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 345.
145See S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna &
Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 344. For instance, states may order an embargo or recall or impose civil penalties. See id.
146See S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna &
Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 344.
14721 U.S.C. x 379r; FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751(b); see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An
Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna & Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 345.
148See S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna &
Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 345.
23by former FDA Commissioner David Kessler:
On analysis, it is important to recognize that the FDA could easily accelerate the availability of new
drugs. Likewise, it could provide greater assurances that drugs reaching the market are safe and
eective. Neither goal alone is sucient, however. The agency's job is to balance the need to make
drugs available quickly with the need to ensure that patients do not receive unsafe or ineective
products. Since it cannot pursue any single objective, criticism can always be leveled against the
FDA from either direction.149
National uniformity and the allowance of state tort suits force the FDA to go in two dierent directions.
National uniformity seeks to ensure that state regulations do not unduly burden interstate commerce so
as to decrease the speed and incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop new drugs. The goal
of tort suits is to increase the safety of drugs, provide compensation to injured plaintis, and to make
manufacturers more responsive to safety needs.150 These tort goals, however, are often accomplished at the
cost of discouraging speedy innovation.151 Which way should the FDA go?
The benets gained from national uniformity { lower cost drugs available to a greater number of consumers
{ are compromised by requiring pharmaceutical companies who comply with FDA regulations to defend
themselves in tort suits. A recent FDA regulation mandating uniform OTC drug labeling represents the
most vivid example of the FDA's attempt to both pursue national uniformity while at the same time force
manufacturers to adhere to higher safety standards imposed by state court juries. In order to fulll the
mandate occasioned by FDAMA, in 1998, the FDA issued a proposed rule which would create a uniform
federal standard for OTC labeling.152 The new label would eliminate the small type and clutter common
150Id. \We simply do not know how to rearrange the electrons or move the relative position of, say, the carbon and hydrogen
molecules so as to squeeze out the drug's tendency to cause nausea or cell mutation, while retaining its benecial physiological
eects. Thus, the regulatory overseer cannot, as with an automobile or industrial machine, specify certain minimum standards
for safety design...that might be characterized as a safety oor. Rather, with nonmodiable drugs, the FDA must decide
whether the therapeutic benets of a new pharmaceutical outweigh the risks it poses through adverse side eects." Id. at
474-475.
151See Schafrick, supra note 44. (\There is growing evidence that the present product liability system positively deters manu-
facturers from researching and developing innovative new products when those products will probably not generate substantial
prots and could lead to substantial product liability claims.")
15221 C.F.R. x 201.66 (1998). The rule states, \This section sets forth the content and format requirements for the labeling
of all OTC drug products. Where an OTC drug product is the subject of an applicable monograph or regulation that contains
content and format requirements that conict with this section, the content and format requirements in this section must be
followed unless otherwise specically provided in the applicable monograph or regulation." Id.
24among current labeling and would highlight signicant warnings.153 The rule, following the language of
FDAMA, explicitly states that state tort suits are not preempted.154 The FDA created this exception,
\because there may be situations in which information about the potential harm from an OTC drug product
may not be available to the FDA until after an individual consumer may have been harmed, the agency does
not want to preclude compensation through tort actions in all cases related to OTC drug labeling."155
The uniform labeling rule, however, has the eect of uprooting the scientic determinations of the FDA as to
what constitutes appropriate labeling. As one commentator has noted, \A jury determination that a label
is inadequate would directly conict with the FDA determination that the label is adequate."156 Is there
any justiable rationale for a jury to conclude that FDA labels on drugs are not adequate to safeguard the
highest degree of safety? Further, applied to state labeling or safety standards, is there any reason that FDA
determinations should be modied by state legislation?
Given that the FDA drug approval system has such a superior safety regard, neither the FDA nor the states
can do more to increase the safety of the drug supply. FDA regulation of drugs is so comprehensive that
state regulation is duplicative and unneeded.157 Since the FDA is a \national expert agency," and its OTC
Drug Review process is \unrivaled in the world," there appears to be \no constitutional or policy reason to
153The Rule proposed ve changes: 1) establishing a standard for the order in which label information appears, headings
and subheadings, the type style and size used on a label, the amount of space between lines of text, the use of upper- and
lower-case letters, and graphical highlights; 2) allowing, but not requiring, manufacturers, packers, and distributors of over-the-
counter products to eliminate certain connecting terms, including `and,' `due to,' `such as,' or `while taking this product,' to
t more information into the new format provided their omission would not change the meaning of the label information; 3)
expanding the list of interchangeable terms dened in current regulations to give manufacturers and distributors more exibility
to use simpler, more understandable words on labels; 4) revising requirements for warnings on over-the-counter labels so these
statements are more concise and easily understood; and 5) preempting state and local laws imposing dierent or additional
requirements for the contents and format of OTC drug labels. 62 Fed. Reg. 9025 (1997).
15462 Fed. Reg. 9024, 9024 (1997). \This proposal would preempt State and local rules that establish dierent or additional
format or content requirements." Id.
15562 Fed. Reg. 9024, 9041 (1997). \The FDA does not want to preclude compensation through tort actions in all cases
related to OTC drug product labeling." Id.
156Whitney, supra note 129, at 349.
157Courts have also recognized the comprehensiveness of FDA regulations. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108,
1112 (4th Cir. 1993) (\FDA's regulation of prescription drugs and biological products is comprehensive...encompass[ing] the
licensing, production, testing, distribution, labeling, review, and approval of all drugs and biologics."); Graham v. Wyeth Labs.,
666 F. Supp. 1483, 1490 (D. Kan. 1987) (\The FDA's regulation of prescription drugs is indeed far-reaching, if not pervasive.")
25prefer `50 mini-FDAs' over a single national one."158 OTC drugs, in particular, are required to \have an
especially wide margin of safety precisely because they are intended to be purchased and used by consumers
without the intervention of a doctor."159 Like OTC drugs, prescription drugs are also subject to the \most
far reaching and pervasive regulations for prescription drugs in the world."160 In fact, the FDA has been
criticized more for being overly cautious in approving new drugs than in being underprotective.161 The FDA
is much more decient in ensuring a speedy delivery of drugs to market than in ensuring safety.162 The
superior safety record of the drug supply is borne out by the low number of tort suits against the pharma-
ceutical industry. Indeed, studies indicate that adverse drug reactions are responsible for less than half of
one percent of deaths of all hospitalized patients { and many of those deaths are attributed to human error
rather than to preventable actions on the part of the pharmaceutical industry.163
Since drug safety is optimal, there appears to be no reason to allow the states to impose additional regula-
tions, regulations which have the secondary eects of driving up costs and confusing consumers. The lack
of uniformity of inconsistent and dierent state requirements for testing, labeling, and packaging drives up
costs { costs which ultimately result in higher drug prices.164 It is not \practical, ecient, or cost eective"
for pharmaceutical companies to comply with, develop, manufacture, and market OTC drugs with 51 dif-
ferent sets of regulations.165 Further, since the federal government is the nancier of medical costs through
158143 Cong. rec. S9846 (Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
159Id.
160Del Giorno, supra note 42, at 645.
161See Green, supra note 50, at 164; see also Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Product Legislation: The 1962 Drug
Amendments, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 1049 (1973).
162See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1753, 1838-1839
(1996); see also Green, supra note 50, at 164. (\Current reform proposals focus not on the need for greater consumer protection
but on the need to accelerate the approval of new drugs so that the public can gain from their therapeutic benets.")
163See Green, supra note 50, at 190, n. 20. The base against which to measure the incidence of tort suits is 2 billion
prescriptions, 60,000 reported adverse reactions yearly. See Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability,
in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability on Safety and Innovation 291, 326 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan,
eds., 1991); see also Donald C. Classen, et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra
Costs, and Attributable Morality, 277 Jama 301, 301 (1997) (noting that adverse drug reports for hospitalized patients were
accountable for.31% of deaths of hospitalized patients, many of which included incidents of the administration of the wrong
drug), cited in Green, supra note 50, at 190, n. 20.
164143 Cong. rec. S9846 (Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
165Gelbert, supra note 80, at 658.
26Medicare and Medicaid, the federal government also has a real interest in determining whether states can
burden interstate commerce by imposing dierent requirements on pharmaceuticals.166
Uniformity is also needed to ensure that patients receive accurate and complete information. Adverse state
court decisions force pharmaceutical companies to change their warning labels.167 Inclusion of additional
warnings overloads the package insert with warnings, many of which may be highly conjectual.168 As
Schafrick notes, \Plaintis' lawyers are, quite properly, concerned with those contentions that will win their
individual cases, and not with what labeling will be most eective for users overall."169 Tort liability and
government regulation can result in two dierent types of labels. Labels which arise out of tort litiga-
tion may cause the manufacturer to exaggerate the hazard and warn consumers of scientically unproven
or remotely possible dangers of a product.170 For instance, in O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc.,171
an FDA-mandated warning stated that \[t]ampons are associated with Toxic Shock Syndrome."(emphasis
added).172 In upholding a verdict for the plainti, the court might be saying that the warning should have
said that tampons cause toxic shock syndrome.173 Overwarning of this sort could deter consumers from
using needed products.174 For instance, jury verdicts against vaccine manufactures discourage the use of
vaccines.175 The utility of information on the package to doctors would also decrease, as doctors might then
disregard additional information if they suspect it is unsubstantiated by scientic fact. 176 Uniform labels,
166See Geiger, supra note 33, at 411; see also H.R. Rep. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1976) (\The Committee
recognizes that if a substantial number of dierent requirements applicable to medical devices are imposed by jurisdictions
other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly burdened.")
167See Del Giorno, supra note 42, at 651.
168See Del Giorno, supra note 42, at 652. In contrast, the FDA provides guidelines which mandate that only scientically
credible information be included in drug labeling. 21 C.F.R. x 1.21(c).
169Schafrick, supra note 44.
170See Schafrick, supra note 44. As Schafrick writes, \Decisions that allow juries to dispute government-approved assessments
regarding a hazard have the eect of encouraging manufacturers to overstate the potential hazards from their products." Id.
171O'Gilvie v. International Playtex Inc., 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987).
172821 F.2d at 1442, n. 2. The FDA warning is codied at 21 C.F.R. x801.430 (1995).
173See Schafrick, supra note 44.
174See Schafrick, supra note 44.
175See Clarke, supra note 98, at 533.
176See Del Giorno, supra note 42, at 652. The Supreme Court stated in Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d
1147 (1984):
[I]t seems obvious that liability ought not to be imposed for failure-to-warn based on every piece of information
27on the other hand, by the nation's premier expert in safety { the FDA { provide a much more eective way
to warn consumers of the real risks associated with a product. Indeed, \More eective labeling will occur
[not as a result of the tort system, but] only when there is a uniform vocabulary, so that the labels use the
same language to warn of comparable hazards from dierent products."177 The FDA system of balancing
risks and costs is simply a more eective way of ensuring that consumers are adequately aware of the risks
associated with a product.178
National uniformity would also safeguard the needed agenda-setting role of states. State regulations more
protective than federal regulations have the desirable eect of forcing the FDA to take action by moving the
item up on the FDA's agenda.179 For example, in 1989, California's Scientic Advisory Panel's subpanel on
Reproductive Toxicity recommended that aspirin be listed as causing reproductive toxicity if used during the
third trimester of pregnancy.180 Complying with the California rule, however, would have conicted with a
proposed FDA rule for an internal analgesics monogroph.181 As a response to the California requirement, the
Nonpresciption Drug Manufacturer's Association petitioned the FDA to implement a third-trimester aspirin
warning prior to publication of the nal monogroph, which the FDA did.182 FDAMA embraces this state's
agenda-setting role, and has included provisions whereby states can petition the FDA to impose additional
safety requirements for OTC drugs.183 Indeed, the FDA \has not failed in any case in the OTC area where
action was otherwise warranted, on the basis of resources."184 This system ensures that states play a role
...available...Moreover, both common sense and experience suggest that if every report of a possible risk, no matter how
speculative, conjectual, or tentative, imposed on a manufacture an armative duty to give some warning, a manufacturer
would be required to inundate physicians indiscriminately with notice of any and every hint of danger, thereby inevitably
diluting the force of any specic warning given.
Id. at 697, 677 P.2d at 1153, cited at Del Giorno, supra note 42, at 656, n. 147.
177Schafrick, supra note 44.
178See Green, supra note 149, at 477 (\[I]t seems plain that the FDA, with its expertise, can reach more accurate decisions
than can a common law jury.")
179See Gelbert, supra note 80, at 658-659.
180See id. at 659.
181See id.
182See id.
18321 U.S.C. x 379(r); FDAMA x 412(a); FDCA x 751; 21 U.S.C. 379(s); FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(b).
184143 Cong. rec. S9846 (Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
28in setting the administrative agenda, yet at the same time, manufacturers would not be forced to adhere to
dierent liability rules and be subject to tort liability where they have complied with the scientically tested
safety requirements of the FDA.
This analysis indicates that in balancing safety versus innovation, the FDA and Congress should take mea-
sures to satisfy the need for speedy access to needed drugs. One of the top congressional \ndings" in writing
FDAMA was that \prompt approval of safe and eective new drugs...is critical to the improvement of public
health so that patients may enjoy the benets provided by these therapies to treat and prevent illness and
death."185 The drug supply is already as safe as it could be. State regulation is simply unnecessary and
carries with it the undesirable side eects of increasing costs and deterring usage. Innovation is a goal that
the FDA should try to achieve. Indeed, Congress explicitly called on the FDA to \promptly and eciently
review clinical research and take appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products in a manner that
does not unduly impede innovation or product availability."186
E. The Trade-O Between National Uniformity and State Product Liability Suits
In order to tilt the FDA's objective towards ensuring that innovative products are developed in a cost-
eective and timely matter, Congress needs to do more than merely establish nationally uniform standards.
Given the benets of national uniformity, there appears to be no reason why Congress and the FDA should
185FDAMA x 101. Other ndings by Congress included, \2) that public health will be served by making additional funds
available for the purpose of augmenting the resources of the Food and Drug Administration that are devoted to the process for
review of human drug applications; 3) that provisions added by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 have been successful
in substantially reducing review times for human drug applications and should be { A) reauthorized for an additional ve years,
with certain technical improvements; and B) carried out by the Food and Drug Administration with new commitments to
implement more ambitious and comprehensive improvements in regulatory processes of the Food and Drug Administration; 4)
the fees authorized by amendments made in this subtitle will be dedicated toward expediting the drug development process
and the review of human drug applications as set forth in the goals identied, for purposes of part 2 of subchapter C of chapter
VII of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, in the letters from the Secretary of Health and Human Services..." Id.
186FDAMA x 101; see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of
FDAMA (McKenna & Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 345.
29allow states through their tort law to intrude or compromise the benets of national uniformity and to
preclude innovation. FDA regulations simply are not mere minimum standards.187 State tort law generally
is necessary to encourage potential tortfeasors to take individual circumstances into account.188 But the
pharmaceutical industry is fundamentally dierent from under industries in which tort law is needed.189
The FDA drug approval process contemplates individualized drug approval to each drug and includes an
individualized assessment of risks and benets.190 Because manufacturers cannot build in additional safety
measures through design changes, the best the FDA can do to safeguard safety is to ensure that the drug's
ecacy suciently outweighs the risk of adverse reactions.191 Tort law simply provides no additional benet
to safety.
Opponents of preemption argue that since many injuries occur after the placement of the drug in the
market,192 allowing state tort claims to be preempted would preclude injured people from being compensated.
Tort law, however, is not the answer. Manufacturers already have an incentive to report adverse eects that
occur post-approval, since the FDA requires manufacturers to revise labeling and warnings \as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug."193 \These results can then
be examined in light of premarketing data, which both the FDA and drug manufacturers are required to
maintain."194 Federal regulations also compel manufacturers to report \any new side eect, adverse reaction,
187See Rissier, supra note 13, at 1423.
188See id.
189See id.
190See id.
191See Green, supra note 149, at 474. \Unlike durable goods, pharmaceuticals cannot be designed dierently, in the sense of
modifying (or adding) to the product so as to build in more safety." Id.
192See Jerey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and Products Liability: Strong Sword,
Weak Shield, 22 Tort & Ins. L. J. 194, 228 (1987) (\A review of...cases shows that the great majority of suits are predicated
on actions or omissions that took place after the drug or device entered the market.")
19321 C.F.R. x 201.57(e); see also 21 C.F.R. x314.80(a). Manufacturers must also submit reports describing its action in
response to adverse reports, any post-approval studies performed on a drug, published reports or studies, or foreign reports of
the drug. 21 C.F.R. xx 314.80(b)-(c).
194Rissier, supra note 13, at 1415.
30or toxicity," whether or not drug related.195 Failure to report results in severe penalties.196 By removing tort
liability, manufacturers may even be more likely to report adverse eects to the FDA. Since adverse reports
to the FDA are discoverable for products liability plaintis, manufacturers are reluctant to report adverse
side eects, however unscientically proven or however rare they may be, to the FDA for fear that plaintis
will use such reports against them in tort actions.197 Preempting state tort suits is especially important
in OTC{switch cases, since plaintis have an easier method of obtaining proof of failure-to-warn. Because
OTC-switch drugs do not contain as comprehensive of information as what is located in the Physician's Desk
Reference (\PDR"), if state tort suits were not preempted, plaintis could simply cite the PDR as evidence
that the OTC-switch drug had a known and foreseeable risk that the OTC-switch drug manufacturer failed
to include in its labeling.198
Tort law also works against national uniformity's goal of reducing drug costs and availability. While national
uniformity would reduce the cost of complying with dierent labeling requirements, state product liability
suits have \done little to further product safety" but have instead been an \active catalyst" for raising the
costs of drugs.199 As the California Supreme Court said in Brown v. Superior Court200 in noting that strict
liability is meant to deter manufacturers from manufacturing unsafe products:
Perhaps a drug might be made safer if it was withheld from the market until scientic skill and
knowledge advanced to the point at which additional dangerous side eects would be revealed. But
in most cases such a delay in marketing new drugs | added to the delay required to obtain approval
for the release of the product from the FDA would not serve the public welfare. Public policy favors
the development and marketing of benecial new drugs, even though some risk, perhaps serious
ones, might accompany their introduction."201
Preemption encourages drug manufacturers to develop safer drugs in a more timely matter. The \economic
195The FDA requires label modication \as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a
drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved." 21 C.F.R. x 201.57(e).
196See Rissier, supra note 13, at 1415.
197See id. at 1406.
198See id. at 1399.
199Walsh, supra note 111, at 1021.
200Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1988).
31unpredictability" of tort actions chills the manufacturers' drive to develop new products or market old
ones.202 Manufacturers will be deterred from research and development, and manufacturers who do develop
new drugs will \test them longer and more carefully, thereby delaying the availability of the drug and its
therapeutic advantages to society."203 Tort suits and the tendency of manufacturers to place unsubstantiated
warnings on products to avoid tort liability can also have the indirect eect of withdrawing a needed product
from the market. For example, the prescription drug Bendictin was prescribed to millions of pregnant
women between 1956 and 1983 to relieve problems associated with morning sickness. In 1983, the drug
was withdrawn from the market as a result of claims that it caused birth defects.204 By 1995, Bendictin
had spent nearly $100 million defending itself,205 despite the fact that an FDA advisory committee had
concluded that there was no evidence of a link between the drug and an increased risk of birth defects.206
The FDA continues to approve Bendictin and its principal ingredient is still in use in many OTC medicines.
Tort liability has also caused manufacturers to restrict the sale and distribution of vaccines.207 For instance,
two of the three manufacturers of the DPT vaccine withdrew from the market, citing risks of legal liability,
legal costs incurred in defending suits, and the rising costs of insurance, as the primary reasons for their
withdrawal.208
From this analysis, we can conclude that moving toward national uniformity for drugs would have a great
deal of benet. Less burdensome regulations enable the FDA to work toward its goal of encouraging drug
innovation and in ensuring access to needed pharmaceuticals by easing burdens associated with multiple
regulation. What we can also have seen from this analysis is that removing barriers imposed by state
202See Rissier, supra note 13, at 1406.
203Green, supra note 149, at 467; see also Punitive Damages: Tort Reform and FDA Defenses: Hearings on S.671 and S.672
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 141-142 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum)
204See Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Eect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in The Liability Maze, The
Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds. 1991), at 334, 337-341.
205See Punitive Damages: Tort Reform and FDA Defenses: Hearings on S. 671 and S.672 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 141-1423 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum).
206See 45 Fed. Reg. 80, 741, 80, 742 (1980).
207See Clarke, supra note 98, at 516.
208See id. at 544, n.. 17
32legislatures is not enough. Burdens on the pharmaceutical industry { in terms of reducing innovation,
increasing costs, and reducing supply { still exist if state courts are allowed to impose additional regulatory
measures on pharmaceutical companies. True national uniformity { and any eective goal of realizing
international standards and encouraging innovation { can only be achieved if all burdens imposed by the
states are removed.
V. Medical Devices
A. History of Medical Device Regulation
The 1938 Act gave the FDA limited power over medical devices. The Act prohibited the entry of misbranded
or adulterated medical devices into interstate commerce,209 and imposed requirements for the labeling of
medical devices.210 The Act did not, however, require premarket safety testing for medical devices nor
did it require good manufacturing practices.211 In 1970, the Cooper Committee, formed by the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare, conducted a study which reported that medical devices had caused or
contributed to over 700 deaths and over 10,000 injuries during a ten-year period.212 Concern over the safety
of medical devices prompted Congress to grant enhanced power to the FDA to regulate. The 1976 Medical
Device Amendments (\MDA") and its subsequent regulations subjected new medical devices to the kind
of premarket approval processes required for drugs.213 Increased control over labeling and the imposition
of good manufacturing practices, combined with increased enforcement authority, helped to put make the
amendments even stronger.214 Congress also created a three-tier system for medical device regulation, based
209Pub. L. No. 75-717. x 501, 52 Stat. at 1049-1050; 21 C.F.R. x 502.
210See Howard M. Holstein & Edward C. Wilson, Developments in Medical Device Regulation, in Fundamentals of Law
and Regulation 258 (Edward P. Brady et al. eds, 1997)
211See Robert R. Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation of Medical Devices Over the Last 50 Years, 50 Food &
Drug L. J. 163, 163-164 (1995).
212See id. at 165.
21321 U.S.C. x 351(f)(1). \A device may not be manufactured, packaged, stored, labeled, distributed, or advertised in a
manner that is inconsistent with any conditions to approval specied in the PMA approval order for the device." 21 C.F.R. x
814.80. See Larry R. Pilot & Daniel R. Waldmann, Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997: Medical Device
Provisions, 53 Food & Drug L. J. 267, 269 (1998).
214General controls, relating primarily to reporting, recordkeeping, and adequate labeling and good manufacturing practices,
33on increasing levels of risk to users.215
The history of medical devices and preemption provides the clearest example of how Congress signaled out
a specic FDA-regulated product for special treatment. Long before the possibility of preemption was ever
seriously discussed for OTC drugs or cosmetics, the MDA contained an express preemption provision.216 The
preemption provision of the MDA was a response to state laws enacted in the wake of quality problems with
unregulated medical devices, such as the Dalkon Shield and cardiac pacemakers.217 In the 1970s, at least
13 states had enacted laws to regulate the safety of medical devices.218 California's Sherman Law was the
most comprehensive.219 The Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic law, adopted in 1970, required premarket
approval of new medical devices, manufacturer compliance with good manufacturing practices, and inspection
provide the minimum level of protection for medical devices. The general controls are set forth in 21 U.S.C. xx 351, 352, 360,
360f, 360h, 360i, and 360j; 21 C.F.R. x 800 et. seq.
215Pub. L. No. 75-717 at x 502, 52 Stat. at 1050-1051. For Class I devices (such as bandages), general controls are considered
adequate for the reasonable eectiveness and safety of the device. 21 U.S.C. x 360c(a)(1)(A). Class II devices (such as tampons)
consists of devices for which general controls are not sucient to ensure safety and eectiveness, but there is information to
develop performance standards. 21 U.S.C. x 360c(a)(1)(B). Class II devices are subject to \special controls," which may include
specic performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries, recommendations or guidelines. 21 U.S.C. x360d(2);
21 C.F.R. xx 861.7, 860.3(c)(2); 880.2920, 880.5570. Class III devices (such as articial heart valves) are dened as those that
support or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in preventing the impairment of human health, and present a
potential, unreasonable risk of injury. 21 C.F.R. x 860.3(c)(3). Before marketing, Class III devices must be \substantially
equivalent" to devices in existence before May 28 ,1978, or grant premarket approval after scientic review. 21 U.S.C. x 360e;
21 C.F.R. xx 814.20, 814.80. Class III devices must also satisfy post-approval regulation, such as by maintaining records and
reporting to the FDA. 21 U.S.C. x 360i.
216See supra
217See Lear, supra note 54, at 703. For instance, at the time of enactment of the MDA, the Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive
device, had been linked to sixteen deaths and twenty-ve miscarriages, with over 500 lawsuits pending against the manufacturer
of the Shield. H.R. Rep. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Problems with cardiac pacemakers had necessitated 34 voluntary
recalls of 23,000 units. See id.
218See Lear, supra note 54, at 748, n. 66; 1970 Ariz. Sess. Laws 94, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. x36-1901 (West 1970); 1970
Cal. Stat. 1573, Cal. Health & Safety Code xx 26000-26851 (West 1970); 1970 Cal. Stat. 1514, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code x3365 (West 1970); 1972 Conn. Acts 295, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. xx 20-403, -404 (West 1972); 1976 Ky. Acts 276,
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. x 334.200 (Michie 1976); 1975 Me. Acts 463, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 32, xx 1658-C to 1658-E
(West 1975); 1973 Minn. Laws 383, Minn. Stat. Ann. x 145-43 (West 1973); 1973 N.J. Laws. 19, N.J. Stat. Ann. xx
49.9A-23 to {25 (West 1973); 1975 N.Y. Laws 799, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law x 784 (McKinney 1975); 1969 Ohio Laws 133, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. x 4747.09 (Anderson 1969); 1975 Or. Laws 673, 675, Or. Rev. Stat. xx 694.036, 694.136 (1975); 1969 Tex.
Gen. Laws 366, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4566-1.14 (West 1969); 1973 W. Va. Acts 59, W. Va. Code x 30-26-14
(1973); 1973 Wash. Laws 106, Wash. Rev. Code x 18.35.110(2)(e) (1973). See also 21 C.F.R. xx 808.53-808.101 (1996).
2191970 Cal. Stat. x 1573, Cal. Health & Safety Code xx 2600-26851 (West 1970). See Susan Foote, Loops and Loopholes:
Hazardous Device Regulation under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 7 Ecology
L. Q. 101, 128-30 (1978).
34of establishments with medical devices.220 Congress felt that such laws would disrupt interstate commerce,
so they enacted the MDA to explicitly preempt such laws.221 At the same time, however, Congress felt that
states with stricter requirements than that mandated by federal law should be able to enforce them with
FDA permission.222 Consequently, section b of the preemption provision explicitly allowed states to ask the
FDA for continued application of a stricter requirement.223
Since Medtronic, there has been a great deal of confusion as to exactly what kinds of claims the MDA may
preempt. The Medtronic decision seems to eliminate preemption as a defense for devices cleared under the
x 510(k) process; whether preemption exists for investigational devices and devices approved by the FDA
through the more regulatory-intensive premarket approval process (\PMA") is still subject to debate.224
Since Medtronic, at least some courts have preempted state product liability suits where the device had
220See 1970 Cal. Stat. x 1573, Cal. Health & Safety Code xx 2600-26851 (West 1970); H.R. Rep. 94-853, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976). For instance, as a result of the Sherman Law, intrauterine devices had to withstand premarket clearance in
California. See id.
221H.R. Rep. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1976) (\The Congress recognizes that if a substantial number of diering
requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal government, interstate commerce
would be unduly burdened.")
222See Lear, supra note 54, at 703.
223Section 360k(b) states:
Upon application of a State or political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and
opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a), under such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a
requirement of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if {
1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this Act which would be applicable to the device f an
exemption were not in eect under this subsection; or
2) the requirement {
a. if required by compelling local circumstances, and
b. compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this
Act.
Id. at 21 U.S.C. x 360k(b).
224See Mary Beth Nerass, Medical Device Preemption After Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 51 Food & Drug L. J. 619, 629 (1996).
35undergone either premarket testing225 or had been subject to an investigational device exemption (\IDE").226
The FDA, in response to this trend, had tried but failed, to issue a rule that the MDA does not preempt
state liability actions.227 This rule would have specically stated that clearance or approval under the x
510(k) substantial equivalence process, the x 515 premarket approval process and the x 520(g) IDE would
not have been entitled to preemptive eect.228 The failure to enact the rule added to the explicit rejection
of the proposed rule by some courts229 has left the issue unclear.
B. The Need for National Uniformity for Medical Devices
In the twenty-ve years between the enactment of the MDA and FDAMA, Congress failed to include a similar
preemption provision for drugs, cosmetics, or food. Is there any reason why Congress might not have sought
225See Noah, supra note 53, at 211 (\Device manufacturers ...have benetted from the gradual extension of the federal
preemption doctrine from fairly straightforward cases involving substantive agency requirements expressed in the form of
regulations to more dicult cases involving FDA requirements expressed during a rigorous, but individualized preapproval
process."); see also Peter L. Puciloski, Courts and FDA Wrestle with Preemption Issues, Nat. L. J. (August 31, 1998) at
B11. Some courts have allowed devices which have undergone premarket approval to preempt state product liability actions.
See, e.g., Fry v. Allergan Medical Optics, 695 A.2d 511, 516 (R.I. 1997) (court found a \specic federal interest" in premarket
approval of an intraoctular lens); Mitchell v. Collagen, 126 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 1997) (\[T]he premarket approval process
constitutes a specic federal interest as contemplated in Medtronic and that, therefore, the FDA approval served to impose strict
FDA requirements on the defendant.) In contrast, some courts have allowed tort suits to proceed, because they construe such
suits as \general obligations," applicable even if a device has undergone premarket approval. See, e.g., Wutzke v. Schwaegler,
940 P.2d 1386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (state tort is a matter of \general applicability," so preemption is not given eect);
Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, 656 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (premarket approval is not a specic federal requirement);
Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (premarket approval is not a specic
federal regulation and tort actions are not specic state regulations). For more information, see Daniel G. Jarcho, Premarket
Approval and Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims in the Wake of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 51 Food & Drug L. J.
613 (1996).
226See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronic Pacing Systems, 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997) (preemption applied to claims for cardiac
pacemaker granted under x 520(g)).
227Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 39789 (July 24, 1998); 62 Fed. Reg. 65384 (1997). The FDA sought to \clarify
and codify the agency's longstanding position that available legal remedies, including State common law tort claims, generally
are not preempted under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." Id. The agency based its rejection of the rule on its
failure to \share its thinking" on preemption with Congress during debates of FDAMA. The FDA also noted that it had shared
an early draft of the regulation with the Public Citizen Litigation group, the attorneys for the plainti in Lohr, but it had not
published a notice in the Federal Register. See Puciloski, supra note 225, at B11.
228Exemption from Federal Preemption of State and Local Medical Device Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 65385 (1997), codied
at 21 C.F.R. x 808.1(d)(12) (proposed Dec. 8, 1997).
229Some courts have explicitly rejected the proposed FDA rule. See, e.g., Easterling v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 986 F. Supp.
366 (E.D. La. 1998) (FDA proposed rule was \neither controlling nor persuasive); Worthy v. Collagen, 967 S.W.2d 360 (Texas
1998) (rejecting proposed FDA rule and found premarket approval process to be \suciently specic to have preemptive eect.).
36to enact similar protections for drugs as for medical devices? What spurred Congress to write up a specic
statute to preempt medical devices? Professor Arthur Miller, in his oral argument in the Medtronic case
posited that perhaps \the sociology of the device industry and the critical character of the device industry
as perceived in the seventies, the need for innovation, the need for availability, motivated Congress" to only
preempt medical devices.230 These rationales appear to be equally applicable, however, to drugs. Courts'
subsequent interpretation of the MDA's preemption provision caused an unwarranted departure from the way
courts interpreted implicit preemption for drugs.231 Courts, in essence, were more willing to nd preemption
for medical devices than for drugs,232 despite the fact that in the 1970s and 1980s, the safety record for
medical devices was inferior to that for drugs. In contrast to drugs, FDA regulation of medical devices
was signicantly more lax, so lax so as to prompt congressional hearings on the subject.233 For example,
during the eight years after enactment of the MDA, the FDA failed to have a mandatory reporting system
for device-related injuries and product failures, an oversight cited by the General Accounting Oce to be
inadequate.234 FDA approval of the x 501(k) substantial equivalence process may be more of a \rubber
stamp" than a thorough review.235 As Wilson notes, as of 1993, the FDA had an \unocial policy that
98% of all x 510(k) substantial equivalence applications be approved."236 Another example is performance
230Transcript, at *26. These sentiments were echoed by Carrier where he asks the following questions: \Does the inclusion
of the provision mean that Congress did not consider medical devices as potentially dangerous as drugs, which also might be
inferred from pre-Lohr court decisions construing the provision? Did Congress perceive that the nature of medical device research
and development was suciently dierent from that of drugs that additional encouragement in the form of tort preemption
was required? Was the preemption provision a result of legislative log-rolling, in which passage of the Act was ensured by the
inclusion of a vague preemption provision that the courts would worry about later? Or, as seems most plausible, did Congress
expect states to continue to attempt to concurrently regulate medical devices through positive enactment in a way in which
they had not attempted to regulate drugs for many years?" Carrier, supra note what, at 599.
231See Porter, supra note 71, at 11.
232See supra
233See, e.g., Sta of Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Medical Device Regulation: The FDA's Neglected Child 1, 4 (Comm. Print. 1983), as cited in Ashley W. Warren, Preemption
of Claims Related to Class III Medical Devices: Are the Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered,
49 So. Meth. U. L.R. 619, 644 (1996); see also \Less Than the Sum of Its Parts," H.R. Rep. No. 103-N, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1993) (report highly critical of agency's treatment of medical devices); see also Pilot, supra note 213, at 270.
234See Lear, supra note 54, at 748, n. 115; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting office, Medical Devices: Early Warnings
of Problems Is Hampered by Severe Underreporting (1986).
235See Wilson, supra note 59, at 425.
236Report by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Less than
the Sum of its Parts: Reforms Needed in the Organization, Management and Resources of the Food and Drug Administration
37standards for Class II medical devices. Under the MDA, the FDA was supposed to promulgate performance
standards for Class II medical devices.237 Analysts have estimated, however, that due to limited resources
and the complexity of procedures for creating such standards, it would take nearly 50,000 sta years for the
FDA to nish writing up the standards.238 As a result of the FDA's inability to fulll the MDA's mandate
on performance standards, the Act has been amended to allow Class II devices to be regulated through less
rigorous special controls.239
The arguments in favor of national uniformity for drugs { such as increasing access to needed supplies,
encouraging innovation, and decreasing costs { are also applicable to the medical device context. Indeed,
where the FDA has monitored the safety of medical devices, there is no reason to treat them any dierent
than drugs. Congress should apply preemption in instances where the FDA has thoroughly tested devices
or for which there is a necessary element of experimentation. The \regulation-intensive" and device-specic
PMA and IDE processes are \safety-oriented" and can further a purpose of the MDA to encourage research
and development.240 The PMA process has been characterized as \extensive" and \rigorous," where the
FDA extensively reviews design, labeling and manufacturing data specic to each product to ensure that
there is a \reasonable assurance" that the product is safe and eective.241 Likewise, while investigational
devices are exempt from most safety, ecacy and performance standards,242 device-specic regulations
apply.243 Further, while FDA regulations \do not specify the safe and eective design," they do specify \the
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess, 24 (1993); see also Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations, Medical Device Regulation: The FDA's Neglected Child 1, 4 (Comm. Print. 1983); Wilson, supra note 59,
at 425, 427, n. 150
237See Walsh, supra note 111, at 946-947.
238See id.
239See id.; For examples, see Warren, supra note 233, at 645-647.
240Scott W. Sayler & Steven M. Thomas, Post-Decision Diagnosis: Medical Device Preemption Alive and Mostly Well After
Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 6 Annals Health L. 185, 200. (\[U]nlike in the section 510(k) context, state common law claims
concerning PMA and IDE devices are capable of interfering with or impeding implementation of specic federal interests.")
Indeed, one of the purposes of the MDA was to encourage research and development for medical devices. S. Rep. No. 94-33,
at 1-2 (1976).
241See Sayler, supra note 240, at 201-202.
24221 C.F.R. x812.1(a).
243See Sayler, supra note 240, at 202.
38procedures for determining whether the experimental design is safe and eective."244
National uniformity and the need to encourage innovation is such a worthy goal that disparities in levels of
safety should be resolved not by varying preemption according to diering levels of safety standards, but by
increasing FDA monitoring of the safety of medical devices. The two tensions operating for drug regulation
{ the necessity of ensuring the safety of the product balanced against the desirability of inducing innova-
tive products to speedily come to market { operates equally for medical devices. Through the enactment
of the 1990 Safe Medical Device Amendments,245 the 1992 Medical Device Amendments,246 and FDAMA,
Congress has taken measures to increase the safety of medical devices. In the 1990 Safe Medical Device
Act, Congress required device manufacturers ling x 510(k) premarket notications to make available infor-
mation relating to safety and ecacy and also set a statutory standard for FDA \substantial equivalence"
determinations.247 FDAMA made further revisions as it provided the opportunity for the FDA to condition
approval on postmarket controls, and required that foreign establishments register with the FDA.248
Also, since there is a denitional overlap between medical devices and drugs,249 dierences in standards
increase the chances of FDA misclassication. Regulation of drugs is considerably more expensive, takes
longer, and is more extensive than testing for medical devices.250 Lessened regulatory burdens combined
244Sayler, supra note 240, at 191, 202, citing Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992).
245Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990)
246Pub. L. No. 102-300, 106 Stat. 238 (1992).
24721 U.S.C. x360c(i)(1)(3) (1994). The Safe Medical Device Amendments also require manufacturers to report deaths to
the FDA. 21 U.S.C. x 360i(b). For more information on the Safe Medical Device Amendments and the 1992 Medical Device
Amendments, see Munsey, supra note 211, at 170-176.
248See Pilot, supra note 213, at 277.
249The denitions of drugs and devices both include 1) products recognized in the National Formulary or U.S. Pharmacopeia;
2) products intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, and 3) products that are
intended to aect the structure or any function of the body or man or other animals. Gail H. Javitt, I've Got You Under My
Skin { and I Can't Get Redress: An Analysis of Recent Case Law Addressing Preemption of Manufacturer Liability for Class
III Medical Devices, 49 Food & Drug L. J. 553, 573, n. 30 (1994).
250See id. at 568.
39with preemption of state tort suits encourages manufacturers to attempt to convince the FDA to classify
borderline products as devices.251 For example, manufacturers of Cu-7 IUD tried in the late 1980s to argue
that the product was really a device rather than a drug.252 The FDA has previously classied an IED
that containing heavy metals or biologically active substances as a drug,253 but the defendants argued that
\transitional language in the MDA merited reclassifying the Cu-7 as a device."254 Although the FDA ul-
timately rejected the manufacturer's attempt, leveling out the burdens imposed on manufacturers of drugs
and medical devices would reduce the incentive for manufacturers to attempt reclassication, either as a
medical device rather than a drug, or as a Class I device rather than the more heavily-regulated Class III
device. Consumer safety would be the benefactor of increased regulation.
Thus, since there have been signicant strides in increasing the safety of medical devices, the same forces
operating to encourage preemption of both positive legislative enactments and state tort suits for drugs
should work to ensure that the balance shifts towards encouraging the development of innovative medical
devices. Indeed, the legislative history of the MDA suggests that one of its purposes was to encourage
innovation.255 Congress should take steps now to fulll this mandate. FDAMA is a step in the right direc-
tion. FDAMA encourages the spirit of safeguarding speedy access to medical devices by making signicant
changes in expediting reclassication of medical devices, and in simplifying the recognition and application of
national/international standards.256 But FDAMA does not go far enough. As with drugs, Congress should
explicitly preempt state product liability suits for medical devices. The secondary eects of state tort suits
251See id. \[P]ermitting preemption for devices, while drugs are subject to liability, increases manufacturers' incentives to seek
device classication, and, for the consumer injured by a medical device, raises the stakes of any misclassication by the FDA."
Id. at 569.
252See id. at 568.
253See id.; see Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F.Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp.
1024 (D. N.J. 1988); Tarollo v. G.D. Searle & Co., 704 F.Supp. 653 (D. S.C. 1988); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F.
Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988). In Tarollo, the court denied summary judgment, and did not rule out the possibility that Cu-7
was classied as a device rather than a drug. See 704 F.Supp. at 656.
254Javitt, supra note 249, at 568.
255S. Rep. No. 94-33, at 1-2 (1976), quoted in Carrier, supra note 29, at 548.
256See Pilot, supra note 213, at 277.
40{ a form of indirect state regulation { result in higher cost and lessened innovation. Just as the MDA sought
to solve the same problems by preempting state positive legislative enactments, Congress should undertake
a similar position by preempting state tort suits, thereby eliminating an unnecessary source of regulation.
VI. COSMETICS
A.
History of Cosmetics Regulation
The FDA began regulating cosmetics in 1938. An 1897 version of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act provided
for federal regulation of cosmetics, but the provision was dropped for political reasons.257 After Franklin
Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933, Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York introduced legislation
to strengthen the FDA's powers under the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act.258 Prior to the enactment of the
1938 Act, states regulated cosmetics.259 Congress, concerned with the lack of uniformity in the regulation of
cosmetics and provoked during the Senate debates by a report of a women injured by eyelash dye,260 passed
257See Thomas F. Anderson, Note, Food, Drug or Both? Dual Classication Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 1984 Ill. l. Rev. 987, 989 (1984), citing Anderson, Pioneer Statutes: The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 13 J. Pub.
L. 189 (1964).
258Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); See Thomas J. Donegan, Fifty Years of Cosmetic Safety: A Government and
Industry Partnership, 50 Food & Drug L. J. 151, 152 (1995).
259See id.
260See Jacqueline A. Gre, Regulation of Cosmetics That are Also Drugs, 51 Food & Drug L.J. 242, 244 (1996); Donegan
supra note 258, at 152; 78 Cong. Rec. 8958; S. Rep. No. 493, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 2 A Legislative
History of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and Its Amendments 720, 829 (1970).
41the 1938 Act to prohibit the sale of adulterated261 or misbranded cosmetics.262 Under the Act, cosmetics are
also unlawful if the label or container is false or misleading,263 or if it fails to bear required information.264 In
1960, Congress passed the Color Additive Amendments, which prohibited the use of a color additive unless
there was a regulation listing such addictive for use.265 The Color Additive Amendments also contained a
hotly-debated provision { the Delaney Clause.266 The Delaney Clause sought to protect consumers against
cancer-causing ingredients by placing an absolute bar on color additives which \after tests which are ap-
propriate for the evaluation of the safety or additives for such use, or after other relevant exposure of man
or animal to such additive, it is found by the Secretary to induce cancer in man or animal."267 The FDA
has also passed regulations to govern the making of cosmetic products. The FDA requires manufacturers to
substantiate the safety of each cosmetic product and each ingredient used in the product.268 In 1974, the
FDA derived authority from the Fair Packing and Labeling Act to mandate full ingredient labeling for cos-
metic products.269 FDA regulations also prescribe the method for determining the proper nomenclature for
ingredient labeling.270 The FDA can inspect manufacturing facilities and issue warning letters.271 Further,
26121 U.S.C. x 361; FDCA x 601. A cosmetic is deemed adulterated if a) it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious
substance which may render it injurious to users under conditions of use prescribed in the labeling thereof, or, under such
conditions of use as are customary and usual; b) it consists in whole or in part of any lthy, putrid, or decomposed substance;
c) it has been prepared, packed, or held under unsanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with lth,
or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health; d) its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous
or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health; or e) it is not a hair dye, and it is, or it bears or
contains, a color additive which is unsafe within the meaning of x 721(a).
26221 U.S.C. x 362; FDCA x 602. A cosmetic is deemed misbranded: a) if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular;
b) unless it bears a label containing 1) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; and 2) an
accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count; c) if any word or statement
required by the Act to appear on the label or labeling is not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness ...and
in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual user under customary conditions or
purchase and use; d) if its container is so made, formed, or lled as to be misleading; or e) if it is a color additive and its
packaging and labeling are not in conformity with regulations issued under section 721.
26321 U.S.C. x 362(a)(d); FDCA x602(a)(d).
26421 U.S.C. x 362(b) (c); FDCA x602(b) (c).
265Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (1960).
26621 C.F.R. x 740.10.
26721 U.S.C. x 379e(b)(5)(B).
26821 C.F.R. x 740.10; see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of
FDAMA (McKenna & Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 344.
269Pub. L. No. 89-755, xx 5, 6, 80 Stat. 1296; 15 U.S.C. xx 1454-55 (1988)); see also Donegan, supra note 258, at 155.
27021 U.S.C. x 701.3 (c).
27121 U.S.C. xx 371-374; FDCA x 701-704.
42although the FDA cannot issue product recalls, it can obtain court orders enjoining manufacturers from
producing or distributing a product.272
Unlike the regulation of drugs, cosmetics are not subject to premarket approval,273 safety or ecacy testing,
good manufacturing practices,274 or registration.275 The FDA retains no legal authority to require manu-
facturers to submit lists of ingredients to the agency, or to report consumer complaints.276 Congressional
proposals to require premarket testing of cosmetics failed.277 In 1975, the FDA tried to issue regulations
dening hypoallergenic to mean a lower potential for causing an allergic reaction, and to require that com-
panies submit information to FDA establishing that in fact their products were hypoallergenic.278 A federal
appeals court rejected the regulations.279
Indeed, the FDA has little formal regulatory authority over cosmetics, and instead has relied on a \unique
partnership of government oversight and industry self-regulation" to regulate cosmetics.280 The industry-
funded Cosmetic Ingredient Review (\CIR") became the \cornerstone" of the cosmetic industry's regulation
eorts.281 Founded in 1976, CIR patterned itself after the FDA's Over-the-Counter Drug Review to pro-
vide independent, public review of frequently-used cosmetic ingredients.282 An Expert Panel composed of
seven scientists and physicians examines scientic data on the safety of cosmetic ingredients.283 The FDA
27221 U.S.C. xx 332-334; FDCA x 302-304.
27321 U.S.C. x 355(a); FDCA x 505(a).
27421 U.S.C. x 355(d)(3); FDCA x 505(d)(3).
27521 U.S.C. x 360; FDCA x 510.
276143 Cong. Rec S8885 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
277See Gre, supra note 260, at 246. In 1977, the FDA said it intended to propose GMP regulations for preservative systems
in mascaras as a \rst step" toward cosmetic GMPs. 42 Fed. Reg. 54, 837 (Oct. 11, 1977). CTFA sent a petition to the
FDA requesting that cosmetics be subject only to cosmetic, not drug, GMPs. See Stephen H. McNamara, Preparing for
Cosmetic GMP { A Legal Perspective, 35 Food Drug Cos. J. 651 (1980). The FDA incorporated CFTA's GMP letter into
the Investigations Operations Manual, but later requested the CFTA to withdraw their petition. See Conversation with John
Wenninger, Tech. Dir., CFTA (Feb. 1995), as cited in Gre, supra note 260, at 246, 272.
278See Stehlin, Contact Dermatitis: Solutions to Rash Mysteries, FDA Consumer (May 1990).
279See id.
280Donegan, supra note 258, at 151.
281See id. at 156. \The CIR was designed to help each individual company meet its obligation to substantiate the safety of
each ingredient and formulation prior to marketing products to the public." Id.
282See id. The Research Institute for Fragrance Materials performs a similar role for the safety of fragrance ingredients. See
id.
283See id. Consumer organizations, scientic and clinical societies and governmental agencies nominate members to the CIR.
See id. The FDA, the Consumer Federation of America, and the CTFA also appoint three liaison, nonvoting members. See id.
43also maintains a Voluntary Cosmetic Reporting Program as a means for the cosmetic industry to supply
information on the location of manufacturing establishments, the ingredients used to formulate products,
and the occurrence of adverse reactions to cosmetic products.284 FDA regulations establish the procedure
for the voluntary registration of cosmetic product establishments, the voluntary ling of cosmetic product
ingredients, and the voluntary ling of cosmetic product experiences.285 The FDA also promulgates regu-
lations for cosmetic labeling.286 As Thomas J. Donegan,, Jr., the Vice-President-Legal & General Counsel
of The Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (CTF) notes, \The CIR...[and other programs] com-
bined are very eective in protecting public safety and in anticipating problems before government action is
necessary."287
While the denition of \cosmetic" and the FDA's power to regulate cosmetics has remained unchanged
since 1938, the range of products that t within the Act's denition have included both products consid-
ered cosmetics in the traditional sense, and products which could also t within the \drug" denition of
the statute.288 Some products, such as acne-treatment makeup, antiperspirant deodorant, or cavity-ghting
The Expert Panel \deliberates" in public and reports its ndings in the Journal of Clinical Toxicology. See id. The cosmetic
industry is not bound to follow the Expert Panel's ndings. See Gre, supra note 260, at 246.
284See Donegan, supra note 258, at 156.
285Voluntary Registration of Cosmetic Product Establishments, 39 Fed.Reg. 10,059 (1974) (codied 21 C.F.R. pt. 710);
Voluntary Filing of Cosmetic Product Ingredient and Cosmetic Raw Material Composition Statements, 39 Fed. Reg. 10,060
(1974) (codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 720); Voluntary Filing of Cosmetic Product Experiences, 39 Fed. Reg.10,062 (1974) (codied
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 730).
286See 21 C.F.R. pt. 701. The cosmetic industry also provides other programs and publications to safeguard safe cosmetics
and proper manufacturing; see also Donegan, supra note 258, at 157. Other programs include CTFA's Technical Guidelines
while develops programs to ensure preservatives are eective and to maintain quality control. CTFA also has Occupational,
Environmental Safety and Health Guidlelines to ensure that cosmetic manufacturers comply with applicable law. CTFA also
has a Labeling and Environmental Manual. See id.
287Donegan, supra note 258, at 156.
288See Gary L. Yingling & Suzen Onel, Cosmetic Regulation Revisited, in Fundamentals of Law and Regulation 315
(Edward P. Brady et al. eds, 1997); The FDCA denes \cosmetic" as 1) articles intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or
sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying, promoting
attractiveness, or altering the appearance, and 2) articles intended for use as a component of any such articles; except that such
term shall not include soap. 21 U.S.C. x321(I); FDCA x201(i). The FDCA denes \drug" as \(B) articles intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and C) articles (other than food)
intended to aect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." 21 U.S.C. x321(g)(1); FDCA x201(g)(1).
44toothpaste, may meet the denition of both a drug and a cosmetic by combining the roles of \cleansing" or
\beautifying" with the \mitigation, treatment, or prevention of a disease, or with eects on the structure
or function of the body."289 In regulating these borderline products, Congress has stated that the manu-
facturer's \intended" use should govern whether the product should be regulated as a cosmetic or drug.290
Whether a product is regulated as a drug or as a cosmetic has ramications both for FDA requirements and
manufacturing decisions. If the FDA chooses to regulate the product as a drug, it must meet FDA standards
for both ecacy and safety; if the products is treated as a cosmetic, product liability suits or FDA seizure
proceedings, are the only forms of regulation.291
B. State Regulation of Cosmetic Products
In the past decade, states have increasingly played a role in regulating cosmetic products. States can
independently pass safety laws under state statutes analogous to the FDCA.292 Most state statutes have
used cosmetic regulation as a tool to safeguard the environment.293 For instance, California and other
states have passed laws which limit cosmetics containing volatile organic compounds, which contribute to
In one House version of the FDCA, both foods and cosmetics were excluded from the denition of \drug." See Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act: A Statement of Its Legislative Record 297 (Charles Wesley Dunn ed. 1938). The Senate
version of the bill did not contain this provision; consequently a product may t both the denition of \cosmetic" and \drug."
See id.
289Gre, supra note 260, at 249.
290\The use to which the product is to be put will determine the category into which it may fall...The manufacturer of an
article, through his representations in connection with the sale, can determine the use to which the article is to be put." S.
Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. x 201 (1935).
291See Laura A. Heymann, The Cosmetic/Drug Distinction: FDA Regulation of Alpha Hydroxy Acids, 52 Food & Drug L.
J. 357, 357 (1997).
292See Donegan, supra note 258, at 158. Donegan notes, \As a general rule, these laws have been interpreted consistently
with federal law, and have provided a simple vehicle for state inspectors to supplement the authority and enforcement of the
FDA under the FDCA." Id.
293\Senior executives of cosmetics companies have great concern that in the Nineties, states will get carried away with
environmental restrictions, which will have a great detrimental impact on our industry." (Statement of E. Edward Kavanaugh,
CFTC president), cited in Jim Ostro, State Environment Laws to Hit Cosmetics, Women's Wear Daily (Feb. 23, 1990).
45the formation of ground level ozone.294 Cosmetics are also subject to state packaging requirements.295
These state laws have increasingly come into tension with FDA requirements. State laws mandating that
manufacturers use recycled materials could conict with the adulteration provisions of the FDCA.296 Indeed,
the FDA has voiced concern that \a too-quick imposition of this requirement might pose safety problems
involving migration of contaminants from the recycled materials into the product."297
States have also attempted to regulate cosmetic safety. California's Proposition 65,298 a voter initiative
adopted by California in 1986, primarily dealt with eliminating carcinogens and reproductive toxicants from
drinking water.299 A secondary purpose of the legislation was to impose stringent consumer warning for
consumer products, such as cosmetics.300 Proposition 65 required manufacturers to warn consumers if
normal use of a consumer product would expose them to chemicals \known to the state of California to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity."301 Manufacturers could only escape liability by providing a \clear
and reasonable" warning, and only if the manufacturer could prove that the chemical \had no eect at
1000 times the level in question."302 Cosmetic manufacturers have increasingly experienced the wrath of
294Products containing volatile organic compounds include anti-perspirants, deodorants, hairspray, hair mousse, hair gel,
nailpolish remover and shaving cream. See id. New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Texas, Oregon and
Washington are some examples of states adopting similar laws. N.Y. Comp. Codes. R & Regs. tit. 6, x 235 (1992) ; Mass
Regs. Code tit. 330, x 7.00 et. seq. (1994) ; R.I. Comp. of Rules of St. Agencies, Reg. No. 31, Control of Volatile Organic
Compounds from Commercial and Consumer Products (1994); N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, x 27-24.1-.7 (1995); Tex. Admin.
Code , tit. 30, xx 115.600,.610,.612-.617 (1995); Or. Admin. R. 340-22-800-860 (1994), as cited in Donegan, supra note 258,
at 162, n. 51-56.
295See Donegan, supra note 258, at 161.
296See Donegan, supra note 258, at 161-162.
297Id. \[The] FDA supports the cosmetic industry's eorts to reduce the amount of waste generated from its products as
well as to incorporate recycled packaging material in the manufacture of product containers. However, cosmetic packaging,
including packaging that contains recycled materials, must comply with the adulteration provisions of the Act. In mandating
use levels for recycled material in product packaging, sucient time must be granted to ensure that these new and increased
uses of recycled materials do not introduce potential health hazards." Letter from John E. Bailey, Ph.D., Acting Dir., O. Of
Cosmetics and Colors, FDA, to Thomas J. Donegan, Jr., CFTA (Mar. 24, 1993), as cited in Donegan, supra note 258, at 162.
298Cal. Health & Safety Code, x 25249.10. Proposition 65 was adopted in a referendum, garnering over 60 percent of the
vote in 1987. See Donegan, supra note 258, at 159.
299See id.
300See id. Spurred by trade association groups representing the FDA-regulated industries, California enacted regulations
providing for a \safe harbor" for FDA-regulated products. In 1993, environmental groups successfully challenged the \safe
harbor" regulations. AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, Dkt. No. 502541 (Sacramento Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1992); See Donegan, supra
note 258, at 159.
301Cal. Health & Safety Code x 25249.7(d).
302Id. Regulations promulgated pursuant to Proposition 65 state that consumer products containing chemicals \known to the
state to cause cancer" must bear the following warning: \Warning: This product contains a chemical known to the State of
46Proposition 65.303 In 1993 alone, the group, \As You Sow," sued over 40 manufacturers of personal care
products for failing to warn consumers of the presence of toluene, an ingredient in nail enamel.304 Other
states have sought to adopt other safety measures. New York has considered expiration dates for cosmetics.305
Massachusetts is currently petitioning the FDA to have a consumer right-to-know law, similar to Proposition
65.306 Massachusetts also has a bill (HB 3125) that would institute label warnings and mandatory recycling
for products containing mercury.307
C. Enactment of FDAMA
Through FDAMA, Congress nally introduced legislation to establish uniform national standards for cos-
metics. Under the new law, states would not be able to impose labeling and packaging for cosmetic products
that are in addition to or not identical to federal standards.308 This section would only preempt state laws
when the FDA has not specically acted on the same aspect of labeling.309 Since states have been the \most
active" in packaging and labeling, the compromise reached in FDAMA assures that states will have full
California to cause cancer." Cal. Admin. Code tit. 22, x 12601(a)(A)(1988).
303See Donegan, supra note 258, at 160.
304See As You Sow v. Assorted Nail Polish Mfrs., Dkt. Nos. 950766, 950767, 950768 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993). The suits were
settled under agreements to warn or to eliminate toluene as an ingredient. See Donegan, supra note 258, at 160.
305143 Cong. rec. S9147 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
306Id.
307See Massachusetts Mercury Declaration Bill Should Exempt Cosmetics { CFTA, F-D-C Reports \Rose Sheet," (May, 24,
1999). The bill would require the packaging and product to be labeled with \three chasing arrows," with the words \Contains
Mercury," and with the statement \The Manufacturer of This Product is Required to Provide for Its Recycling." A toll-free
number would also be on the label so that consumers could inquire about recycling. The FDA has an exception to the prohibition
of the intentional addition of mercury by allowing tiny amounts of mercury to serve as a preservative for mascara and eyeliner
when there is no eective and safe nonmercurial alternative. The regulation states that mercurial preservatives for eye makeup
are \warranted because mercury compounds are exceptionally eective in preventing Pseudomonas contamination of cosmetics,
and Pseudomonas infection of the eye can cause serious injury, including blindness." Id.
30821 C.F.R. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(a); see S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An
Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna & Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 344-345.
309143 Cong. Rec. S9147 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
47authority to regulate cosmetics where the FDA has not acted.310 Similarly, if the FDA requires a warning on
a specic ingredient, and the state wishes to impose requirements about another ingredient, the state would
be free to do so.311 The national uniformity provision, however, does not aect a state's ability to \exercise
its police powers against unsafe cosmetic products."312 For instance, if the FDA has a \warning requirement
for a cosmetic ingredient about a particular concern," the state could engage in additional measures, such
as a ban on the ingredient, to protect the public health; the state would not, however, be able to require ad-
ditional labeling concerning the indicated ingredient.313 States also remain free to seize, impose embargoes,
or institute judicial proceedings to guard against adulterated, misbranded or otherwise unsafe products.314
States and localities also remain free to petition the FDA under 21 C.F.R x 10.30 to impose a state-specic
requirement if an important public interest arises, and the requirement would neither violate federal law
nor unduly burden interstate commerce.315 States, who feel their program would benet the nation, could
further petition the FDA to make an certain regulation a national requirement.316 As with OTC drugs,
preemption does not apply to state product liability suits.317 State requirements, such as Proposition 65,
adopted by a state referendum prior to September 1, 1997, also are exempt from the national uniformity
provisions.318
Originally, the bill preempted state regulations dealing with cosmetic safety. Senator Edward Kennedy
decried the Republican majority's attempt to preempt state laws regulating cosmetic safety. He referred to
310See id.
311Id.
312143 Cong. rec. S8880 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
313143 Cong. Rec. S9146 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
314143 Cong. rec. S8880 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
31521 C.F.R. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(b); see S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An
Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna & Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 345.
316See S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 63-67 (1997), as reprinted in An Analytical Legislative History of FDAMA (McKenna &
Cuneo, ed. 1998), at 344-345.
31721 C.F.R. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(d).
31821 C.F.R. x 379s; FDAMA x 412(d); FDCA x 752(e).
48the 1978 General Accounting Oce (\GAO") report which recommended that the FDA be given greater
authority to regulate cosmetic safety.319 The report listed 125 ingredients used in cosmetics suspected of
causing cancer, 25 ingredients suspected of causing birth defects, and 20 items suspected of adversely aecting
the nervous system.320 Kennedy also said that the FDA has not adequately funded cosmetic regulation. Less
than 30 FDA employees regulate the $20 billion cosmetics industry, and only 2 employees actually regulate
cosmetic packaging and labeling.321 Referring to the United States as a \First World country with a Third
World cosmetics safety system,"322 Kennedy said that consumers \would be shocked" to learn that there is
no federal regulation of cosmetic safety.323 He argued that cosmetics are the only FDA-regulated product
without adequate protection, as the FDA regulates safety standards for drugs, medical devices and food
additives.324
Kennedy is not alone in his support for increased cosmetic safety. For years, Congress has initiated legislation
and explored hearings to inquire into the problem.325 Representative Wyden, Chairman of the House
Committee on Small Businesses, said in 1989, \In my view, these regulatory gaps raise serious questions about
the Food and Drug Administration's ability to eectively oversee the cosmetics industry in this country."326
During the congressional debates on FDAMA, opponents said that nding national uniformity would be a
law \directing the FDA into empty regulation."327 \The FDA not only lacks the authority to require safety
319143 Cong. rec. S8884 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). See U.S. General Accounting Office, lack of
Authority Hampers Attempts to Increase Cosmetic Safety (1978).
320143 Cong. rec. S9146 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
321143 Cong. rec. S9148 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
322143 Cong. rec. S8886 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
323143 Cong. rec. S8885 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
324143 Cong. rec. S9150 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
325See Gre, supra note 260, at 244 , n. 14 (citing e.g., H.R. 2244, 83d Cong. (1953); H.R. 4476, 84th Cong. (1955); H.R.
4015, 86th Cong. (1957); H.R. 4431, 85th Cong. (1957); H.R. 9153, 85th Cong. (1957); H.R. 1360, 86th Cong. (1959); H.R.
5661, 86th Cong. (1959); H.R. 1235, 87th Cong. (1961); H.R. 11,582, 87th Cong. (1962); H.R. 1235, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R.
5777, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 6788, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 8418, 88th Cong. (1963), H.R. 1235, 89th Cong. (1965); H.R.
1235, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 4486, 90th Cong. (1967). Senator Kennedy has said, \In fact, every time that Congress has
revisited cosmetic regulation, it has resulted in a call for additional protection and additional safety measures." H, 66.
326Heymann, supra note 291, at 176.
327143 Cong. rec. S9148 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of David Wallinga, M.D., Senior Scientist, Public Health Program,
Natural Resources Defense Council, September 10, 1997) (\Who Will Act to Protect the Public from Hazardous Products in
Cosmetics if S.830 Passes? No One Will!")
49testing, it also has very weak authority to require product labels that reect health and safety concerns about
cosmetics."328 Supporters of increased regulation also argue that the FDA provides only weak enforcement
authority under the adulteration, misbranding and color addictive provisions.329
D. The Need for National Uniformity for Cosmetics
Despite the \lenient" regulation of cosmetics,330 Congress should impose a nationally uniform standard for
both the safety and labeling of cosmetic products. Unlike drugs, cosmetics do not need to be regulated as
heavily. Cosmetics are one of the safest products regulated by the FDA.331 Indeed, the FDA devotes less
of its resources to cosmetic regulation because of its extraordinary safety record.332 For instance, cosmetic
injuries in one study constituted.00044 percent or less than ve ten-thousandths of the product sold, in other
words 47,000 products out of 10.5 billion products sold.333 There have been twice as many injuries caused
by couches and sofas, and six times the number of injuries caused by pillows, mattresses, and beds.334 While
it is true that according to a study by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health Registry
of Toxic Eects of Chemical Substances (\NIOSH"), 884 cosmetic ingredients have been found to be toxic,
this list also included elements such as water, salt, and vinegar.335 The GAO listed 125 ingredients found
to cause cancer or birth defects, but the GAO did not perform the tests at high exposure levels and stated
328143 Cong. rec. S9148 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
329See Yingling, supra note 288, at 361-62.
330See Gre, supra note 260, at 243.
331In 1988 hearings on cosmetic safety, former FDA commissioner Frank Young said that \Congress, when it passed the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, recognized that cosmetics were the lowest of the hazards, and I would still conrm
that point. I believe that cosmetics are safer than other products we regulate." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Reg. and
Bus. Opportunities of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 2d. Sess. 67 (1988) (testimony of Frank E.
Young, Comm'r of Food and Drugs); Former Commissioner David Kessler also said before a House subcommittee meeting that
cosmetics are \as safe as they come." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Small Bus., 102d Cong,, 1st Sess. 106 (1991) (testimony of David A. Kessler, Comm'r of Food and Drugs).
332143 Cong. rec. S8880 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
333143 Cong. rec. S8892 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
334See id.
335143 Cong. rec. S8892 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeords).
50that they did not review the applicability of the tests to cosmetics.336 The report stated, \Neither we nor
NIOSH has reviewed the adequacy of the tests performed or the applicability of the tests performed or the
applicability of the results to exposure to the ingredients through the use of cosmetics."337 Moreover, the
CIR has never denied an FDA request to review the safety of a cosmetic ingredient.338
Senator Kennedy specically signaled out alpha hydroxy acids,339 feminine hygiene products340 and talc341
as posing special safety threats to consumers. However, either the CIR or the FDA had thoroughly studied
these products and found they were not harmful.342 The CFTA says that the CIR had conducted a \thorough
review" of alpha hydroxy acids, nding that these ingredients were safe for use in products of no greater
than 10% at a ph of no less than 3.5.343 The panel recommended that alpha hydroxy products be either
formulated not to be sun-sensitive or to contain labeling stating that sunscreen is necessary. The FDA also
placed the study of alpha hydroxy acids among the cosmetics programs' top priorities in 1999.
State regulation in fact is often not even aimed at increasing cosmetic safety. Even Senator Kennedy
admits that states \virtually never" use their authority to ban a particular ingredient.344 Many of the state
regulations pertain to state environmental law. This \pits" the environmental objectives of the state against
336See id.
337See id.
338See id.
339Senator Kennedy said that between 1989 and 1996, there were \many thousands" of complaints associated with alpha
hydroxy acids, such as redness, burning, blistering, bleeding, rash, itching and skin discoloration. 143 Cong. rec. S9149 (Sept.
11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
340Senator Kennedy noted that data indicated that the use of feminine hygiene products increased the overall risk of pelvic
inammatory disease by 73% and the risk of ectopic pregnancy by 76%. 143 Cong. rec. S9149-50 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy).citing J. Zhang, AG Thomas, and E. Leybovich, Vaginal Douching and Adverse Health Eects: A Meta-
analysis, American J. of Pub. Health, 1997 July: 87(7), 1207-1211. Studies have also found an increased risk of cervical
cancer. J, 51, citing Gardner JW, KL Shuman, ML Slattery, JS Sanborn, TM Abbott, and JC Overall, Jr., Is Vaginal Douching
Related to Cervical Carcinoma?, Amer. J. of Epidemiology, 1991 Feb; 133(4): 368-375.
341Senator Kennedy stated that talc poses a risk of ovarian cancer. 143 Cong. Rec. S9150 (Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy), citing Chang, Stella and Risch, Harvey. Perineal Talc Exposure and Risk of Ovarian Carcinoma, 79 Cancer
( June 15, 1997).
342The Cosmetic Ingredient Review panel had concluded in a 1996 that alpha hydroxy were not harmful. FDA records
indicated that there were no reports in 1996 about feminine hygiene products. In 1994, the FDA did a study on talc and found
only a nominal link between ovarian cancer and talc.
343See \AHA Further Study is Misuse of Cosmetic Resources, CFTA Says," F-D-C Report, The Rose Sheet (March, 1, 1999.)
344143 Cong. rec. S8878 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
51the safety requirements of the FDA.345 For instance, California and Oregon require cosmetic manufacturers
to reduce the size of packaging, supply reusable containers, or ensure that recyclable material composes a
portion of the product.346
On the whole, the FDA { an agency of limited resources { would be better able to protect consumers
against the more dangerous eects of cosmetics whose active ingredients or intended use mirror that of
highly-regulated drugs by regulating such products as drugs. If the FDA had more substantial authority
over cosmetic regulation, the FDA would not have an incentive to interpret the \drug" denition broadly so
as to encompass the more dangerous borderline cosmetic/drug products.347 The cosmetic industry's strong
safety record as well as its voluntary safety substantiation and labeling programs have allowed the industry
to escape stringent FDA oversight.348 Few controls are placed on cosmetics, but \the situation changes
dramatically" if a cosmetic could also be classied as a drug, since it would then be subject to stricter
standards of premarket testing and good manufacturing processes.349 If cosmetic regulation is lax, products
on the borderline which contain levels of drug ingredients350 are more likely to be regulated as drugs and
subject to more rigorous FDA restrictions, such as limits on the use of ingredients, labeling requirements,
or preclusion of ineective ingredients.351 Many of the examples of dangerous cosmetics cited by Senator
Kennedy are ones in which the problem could be better solved by regulating the product as a drug. Alpha
hydroxy acids pose one example. In 1994, the FDA received 200 reports of adverse cosmetic reactions. More
345Donegan, supra note 258, at 151.
346See Donegan, supra note 258, at 161; See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Res Code PUB. x 42300; OR. REV. STAT. x 459A650-665.
347See Gre, supra note 260, at 253. \The FDA's primary motive for classifying a cosmetic as a drug is to allow the agency to
apply drug regulations to the product, rather than cosmetic regulations." Id; see also Margaret Gilhooley, Cosmetic Regulation:
Going Beyond Appearance, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Volume of Food and Drug Law 323, 323-24 (Food & Drug Law
Inst. 1984), as cited in Gre, supra note 260, at 253.
348See Donegan, supra note 258, at 162.
349Gre, supra note 260, at 243.
350There are a variety of approaches the FDA could take in making the cosmetic drug distinction. See id. at 253-257. The
FDA could classify based on claims, ingredients, or risk, among others. See id.
351See Gre, supra note 260, at 272.
52than 10% of those reports concerned products containing the chemical alpha hydroxy acid, a chemical which
has often been suggested to be regulated as a drug.352 John Bailey, Director of the Oce of Cosmetics and
Colors of the FDA, has stated, regarding AHAs, that \the legal scheme that applies to cosmetics...is clearly
inadequate to products that have a physiological eect beyond that which occurs with traditional cosmetic
products." (emphasis added).353 To solve the problem, rather than calling for regulation by the states
of cosmetic products, the FDA should develop more consistent denitions of what constitutes a drug and
what constitutes a cosmetic. The \intended use" method of characterizing borderline products provides \no
clear connection to product safety," because characterization is based on the manufacturer's labeling of the
product rather than the product's underlying chemical composition.354 Wrinkle creams bests demonstrate
the \incongruity" of the current system of FDA classication.355 The same product { a combination of
bovine albumin and water, that formed a lm that temporarily smoothed wrinkles { had been marketed by
dierent companies under dierent names.356 The Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals classied
the product as a drug, because the manufacturer proclaimed in advertising that the product was therapeutic
rather than cosmetic in nature.357 In contrast, a Maryland federal district court classied the very same
product as a cosmetic.358 Instead of relying on the manufacturer's idea of \intended use," the FDA should
classify products as drugs if the cosmetic product contains an ingredient or eect that mirrors a drug.359
Greater regulation by the states does not need to be imposed because cosmetic companies will have to
352See Stehlin, supra note 278.
353F.D.C. REP. (\The Rose Sheet") ( Dec. 11, 1995), at 1, 3, as cited in Heymann, supra note 291, at 375, n. 92.
354Heymann, supra note 291, at 370-371.
355See Heymann, supra note 291, at 366.
356See id.
357In United States v. Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit said that the cream should be
characterized as a drug because it promised \a face lift without surgery." Id. at 739. In United States v. Line Away, 415 F.2d
369 (3rd Cir. 1969), the Third Circuit said that the product was a drug because it \tightened the skin," and was \superactive."
Id. at 372. See also Heymann, supra note 291, at 365-367.
358In United States v. Magic Secret, 331 F. Supp 912 (D. Md. 1971)., the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
said that claims, such as \protein, \ and \astringent sensation," made the product a cosmetic. Id. at 917.
359See Heymann, supra note 291, at 368.
53meet higher standards if they wish to compete in the global marketplace. More than any other FDA-
regulated product, cosmetics are a global industry.360 Comprising $21 billion in annual sales, more than
10 billion individual packages move through interstate commerce annually.361 Cosmetics produced in the
United States are also increasingly being sold abroad. Exports by U.S. cosmetics company were expected
to top $2.8 billion in 1999.362 Given these gures, manufacturers should have exibility to react quickly
to marketplace trends, and to move in and out of geographic areas. The most successful global cosmetics
company, L'Oreal, distributes its products worldwide by \conveying the allure of dierent cultures through
its many products."363 Reaching $12.4 billion in revenues in 1999, L'Oreal has also extended its global reach
by acquiring the United States' company Maybelline and in forming a joint marketing venture with a leading
Japanese company. As Louis Santucci, international vice-president of the Cosmetic, Toiletry, & Fragrance
Association has said, \there is a dollars and cents reality and urgency to harmonization...Once all of these
regulations are the same and streamlined, a company can introduce many new cosmetic products at the
same time all around the world. The savings and opportunities are absolutely enormous."364
In response to this trend, the United States should be shifting towards greater harmonization within its
borders in order to reduce the costs of complying with diverse and complicated cosmetic regulatory systems
abroad.365 Compared to other nations, the United States has a weak governmental regulatory system in
cosmetics. Japan's cosmetic regulatory system, for instance, is much more restrictive than that of the United
360See Gail Edmonson, \The French Giant Stays on Top by Selling Cultural Cachet as well as Cosmetics," Business Week,
June 28, 1999.
361142 Cong. Rec. S11962 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
362The Asian economic crisis led to less than expected revenues for the cosmetics industry in 1999. See Ostro, supra note
293. Shipments overseas by U.S. cosmetic companies generally outpace imports by a two to one margin. See id.
363Id.
364See id.
365Orrin Hatch stated \A single nationwide system for regulating the safety and labeling of cosmetic products would take a
great step toward helping the industry move toward the international trends in marketing. At the same time, it would be a more
ecient system, since allowing individual States to impose varying labeling requirements inevitably leads to higher prices." 142
Cong. Rec. S12053 (Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
54States.'366 Cosmetics in Japan must meet premarket approval,367 and there is an intermediate level of regu-
lation for quasi-drugs, cosmetics which would meet both the denition of cosmetics and drug under the U.S.
system.368 Japan also species ingredients and the maximum amount allowed to be combined into cosmetic
products.369 In 1997, the European Union adopted two amendments which dier from U.S. requirements.370
Manufacturers in Europe must maintain a \dossier" or information packet; a dossier for public access is not
required in the United States.371 The European Union also mandates full ingredient disclosure, including
expiration dates, function of ingredients, precautions, and batch numbers.372 Although premarket approval
is not required for Canadian cosmetics, the Ministry of Health may require the submission of safety data;
manufacturers may also be required to notify the Health Protection Branch of Health Canada of adverse
reactions within 10 days of an item's distribution.373 New rules expected to be enacted this year call for
mandatory disclosure of all contents in cosmetics.374 Mexico requires premarket registration for cosmetic
or drug products which \pose a risk to health" because they contain certain ingredients identied by the
state.375 Mexico also compels manufacturers to conduct certain testing for specic products; while these
tests do not need to be submitted to a central regulatory agency, they must be furnished upon request.376
Expiration dates are also required in Mexico.377 Sweden and Denmark have product registration for cos-
366See Brad S. Hendrick & Linda R. Horton, International Harmonization of Cosmetic Regulation, in Fundamentals of
Law and Regulation 491-492 (Robert E. Brady et al. eds, 1997).
367143 Cong. Rec. 8886 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
368See Hendrick, supra note 366, at 492-493. \Quasi-drugs" are dened as consisting of items that \have a mild eect on the
body and have a denite purpose of use including prevention of nausea or other discomfort, foul breath or body odor; prevention
of prickly heat and sores; prevention of hair loss, promotion of hair growth, or removal of hair; and eradication of rats, ies,
mosquitoes, eas, etc." Cosmetic, Toiletry, & Fragrance Ass'n, CTFA International Regulatory/Resource Manual,
267 (4th 3d. 1995), as cited in id.
369See id. at 269.
370See Hendrick, supra note 366, at 491.
371See Council Directive, 76/768, art. 7a, para. 12, 1993 O.J. (L. 151), at 34 (Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957, pt. II, art. 36, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 45).
372See Council Directive 95/17, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 140) 27.
373Cosmetic, Toiletry, & Fragrance Ass'n, supra note, at 55.
374Safety of Cosmetics to be Checked, Toronto Star, (November 25, 1999).
375See Hendrick, supra note 366, at 499.
376Cosmetic, Toiletry, & Fragrance Ass'n, supra note, at 333.
377143 Cong. Rec. 8886 (Sept. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
55metics.378 Germany, France and Australia place \more stress" on cosmetic ingredient safety than the FDA
does.379
The FDA is at a crossroads. Faced with the need for harmonization, the FDA could either increase its
regulation of cosmetics, and bring itself more into line with the European Union, or the FDA could encour-
age other nations to lower their standards to that of the United States.' Interestingly, some countries are
moving more in the direction of the United States. In 1998, Japan moved to deregulate its rigorous cosmetic
regulation system, to bring it \in line with freer foreign markets and to provide Japanese consumers with
more choices while ensuring their safety."380 To this eect, Japan plans to ease or eliminate requirements
for licenses, shift toward the use of a negative list of ingredients,381 and \place the responsibility over safety
in the hands of the companies and the consumers themselves." More signicantly, Japan plans to dismantle
its premarket approval for cosmetics by next year.382
Furthermore, cosmetic manufacturers already have an incentive to develop the safest products they can,
such that further state regulation is unnecessary. Many manufacturers of cosmetic products conduct pre-
market tests, because they fear the \loss of goodwill" or reputation that could accompany reports of adverse
reactions.383 One cosmetic ocial has stated: \The law says it is prohibited for a company to produce a
cosmetic product that could be injurious to the consumer under normal use...If I am a cosmetic ocial, and
378See id.
379See Donald A. Davis, Regulatory Politics: Political Aspects of Regulations Governing Cosmetics Industry, Drug and
Cosmetic Industry, (Nov. 1, 1992).
380Panel Proposes More Competition in Cosmetics Market, Japan Weekly Monitor, July 27, 1998.
381Currently in Japan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare provides a \positive list" of cosmetic product ingredients. There is
also a negative list for ingredients prohibited for use. If a cosmetic manufacturer includes ingredients located on the negative
list or uses positive list elements above a certain limit, they must get the approval of the Ministry. Accordingly, on labels,
the Japanese only include ingredients likely to cause problems. In contrast, in the United States and France, manufacturers
are obligated to include all of the ingredients used. Japan is currently in the process of revising its rules to bring them into
conformity with international standards. Japan annually receives over $740 million a year in imported cosmetics, primarily from
France, and the United States. See Industry News: Cosmetics Industry Adopts New Standards for Labeling of Ingredients,
Comline Pacific Research Consulting, (January 7, 1999).
382See Ostro, supra note 293.
383Heymann, supra note 291, at 372.
56I have that as a law, why do I need some kind of review by anybody prior to marketing? ...If you can't have
happy, healthy consumers, you are going to lose a lot of money."384 Furthermore, a \bad reputation" in one
product line could \spill over" into a cosmetic manufacturer's other product lines and decrease sales.385 The
cosmetic industry has shown itself to be respond responsibly in the wake of cosmetic tragedies. For instance,
when there was a report of a woman permanently blinded by a mascara wand, the leading manufacturer of
mascara, Maybelline, led in an industry-wide cleanup of manufacturing standards and a warning to women
to cease sharing mascara wands.386 The report of a woman burned by an alpha hydroxy peel resulted in
an industry-wide voluntary ceiling on AHA percentages in skin care products sold in retail stores.387 The
industry is also aware that if it does not eectively self-police, the government can pass legislation imposing
governmental regulation.388
On the whole, there is no reason why the states should intrude and oer additional regulations on cos-
metic safety. State regulation has the undesirable side eects of increasing costs and inhibiting the free
ow of goods. Industry self-regulation added to both the practical necessity of complying with divergent
international regulatory regimes and in satisfying consumer expectations has made cosmetics safe, such that
there is no reason for states to add additional and unnecessary levels of protection. Further, in the few
circumstances where concerns of safety may be raised, increased and uniform regulation at the federal level
or reclassication of such items as drugs would be a more eective way of ensuring that consumers are not
injured.
384Cosmeceuticals: New Class of Products Oers Important Benets for Aging Customers, Chain Drug Rev. , Sept. 23, 1996,
at 92 (quoting Gerald McEwen, Vice Pres. For Sci., CTFA), as cited in Heymann, supra note 291, at 375, n. 124.
385Marc S. Moller & Paul Indig, Products Liability Law Revisited: A Realistic Perspective, 31 Tort & Ins. L. J. 879 (1996).
386See id.
387See id. \Senator Kennedy displayed no interest in relating how the industry reacted to these incidents, instead honing in
on the \greed" and \arrogance" displayed by the marketers' in attempting to elicit the help of Congress in preempting states
from imposing new warning labels." Id.
388Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 50 Food and Drug L. J.
101,. 106 (1995) (historical article originally presented at the Food and Drug Law Institute { Food and Drug Administration
Sixteenth Annual Educational Conference in Washington D.C. on December 12, 1972.)
57E. The Trade-O Between National Uniformity and State Product Liability Suits
Critics of preemption of state tort liability might argue that the factors cautioning against liability for drugs
and medical devices do not apply to cosmetics. Unlike drugs and medical devices, there does not exist as
pressing a need to ensure speedy access to innovative cosmetic products. Speedy access is needed for drugs
and medical devices to safeguard life and death, but quickly available cosmetic products are only necessary
to satisfy consumer expectations and to generate increased sales for cosmetic companies.
However, dierences in the necessity for innovation should not distract from the argument that cosmetic
companies should not be subject to state tort suits. As with drugs and medical devices, Congress and the FDA
should recognize that additional state regulation through state tort suits is also unnecessary. Manufacturers
are only liable for foreseeable injuries.389 Because most reports to the FDA regarding cosmetics pertain
to allergic reactions or skin irritation, there is nothing the FDA can do to prevent these.390 The FDA
received 65 reports of adverse skin care products and makeup, but most of those reports were the result of
either an allergic reaction or to a skin irritation.391 Further, since cosmetic accidents are often random and
dicult to foresee, post-accident challenges to warnings would likely have little material eect on the overall
accident rate.392 Courts have agreed, and manufacturers are also not generally held liable for such actions in
product liability suits.393 Plaintis also face causation problems, as generally courts hold that a plainti's
own \idiosyncratic" allergic reaction constitutes the proximate cause of the injury rather than the cosmetic
itself.394 Individual users must take responsibility to become aware of their allergies and to avoid products
389See Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963); Howard v. Avon Products, Inc., 395 P.2d 1007 (1964).
390See Stehlin, supra note 278.
391See Stehlin, supra note 278.
392See Schafrick, supra note 44.
393See Moller, supra note 385; Annotation, Where Injury Results from Allergic (Side Eect) Reaction to a Product, 53 A.L.R.
3d 298 (1994)
394See Moller, supra note 385; see, e.g., Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1988)
(\There is generally no duty to warn of harm from an unusual allergic reaction from use by a minuscule percentage of users
when the risk is so rare that the injury is considered to result from a personal idiosyncracy of the consumer." ); Hafner v.
Guerlain, Inc., 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (manufacturer could not anticipate reaction because plainti's reaction
58containing the \oending ingredient."395 As with state positive legislative enactments, there appears to be
no reason why states should be able to impose additional requirements. The secondary eects of tort suits
{ such as increased costs and delayed innovation { are simply unnecessary burdens to bear if one considers
that there is no balancing factor in terms of increased safety to justify such suits.
VII. Food
A. History of Food Regulation
During the 19th century, states, pursuant to their police powers, began increasingly to regulate the food
industry.396 The United States Supreme Court, however, struck down many of these laws as being violative
of either the Commerce or Supremacy clauses of the Constitution.397 To ll the void, and to respond to an
ever-increasing national food supply, Congress established the FDA and passed the 1906 Pure Food and Drug
Act, the rst federal enactment to protect the nation's food supply. The Act prohibited the adulteration and
misbranding of food products, and provided criminal prosecution and product seizure and condemnation as
remedies for enforcement of violations.398 When Congress amended the Act in 1938, it included a per se
rule against all unnecessary and avoidable poisonous and deleterious substances added to food.399
was \abnormal"); Quiroz v. Max Factor, Inc., 264 So.2d 263 (La. App. 1972) (plainti was unable to dierentiate between a
\caustic" reaction and an \allergic" reaction).
395See Moller, supra note 385. Indeed, a user's failure to read the warning usually negates manufacturer liability. see, e.g.,
Thomas v. Clairol, Inc., 583 So.2d 108 (La. App. 1991) (plainti's failure to read allergey test instructions was the proximate
cause of injury); See also Stehlin, supra note 278. \Consumers must taken an active role in keeping product contamination and
potential infection to a minimum once they take a product home." (Statement of Gerald McEween, Ph.D., Vice President for
Science, CFTC) as cited in id.
396See Kyle W. Lathrop, Pre-empting Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling, 16 J. Corp. L.
885, 887 (1991).
397See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (invalidating an Iowa law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages
brewed in other states, but sold in Iowa); Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898) (invalidating an Iowa law that required a state
issued permit for transport of intoxicating beverages); see also Lathrop, supra note 396, at 930, n. 22-23. After the Court's
decision in Leisy, Congress passed a statute which ratied the decision. See id. at 930, n. 25.
398See Frederick H. Degnan, The Regulation of Food Safety, in Fundamentals of Law and Regulation 163 (Robert P. Brady,
ed. 1997). Under the Act, food was considered adulterated if it were prepared in ways that reduced quality, permitted passing
o, rendered it injurious to health, or resulted in contamination and lth. See id. Food could also be considered adulterated if
it \contained an added poisonous or other deleterious ingredient which may render [the food] injurious to health." Id.
399See id. at 164.
59After World War II, Congress shifted its interest to controlling for chemicals in food. A House Committee
recommended in 1952 that chemicals used on or near food subscribe to the same safety requirements as that
of new drugs.400 To that end, in 1954, Congress adopted the Pesticide Residues Amendment, which said
that pesticide residues are considered adulterated unless a tolerance or tolerance exemption was given.401
Comprehensive reform occurred in 1958 through the adoption of the Food Additives Amendment.402 The
Amendment were designed \to ensure the safety of food ingredients and to promote public condence in the
processed food supply" by establishing a premarket approval system for \food additives."403 The Delaney
Clause was also adopted. The Clause precluded the use of additives that were thought to cause cancer. The
Color Additives Amendment, adopted in 1960, subjected all colorants in food, drugs, and cosmetics to a
uniform premarket approval system of regulation.
The FDCA also provides FDA authority for food labeling. Section 401 of the FDCA authorized the FDA
to publish \regulations xing and establishing for any food, under its common or usual name so far as
practicable, a reasonable denition and standard of identity."404 Unlike drugs, the FDCA does not explicitly
authorize the FDA to require warnings labels on food products.405 Section 403 of the FDCA also prohibits
the misbranding of food under certain circumstances.406
B. State Regulation of Food
400See H.R. Rep. No. 2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
401Pub. L. No. 518, 68 Stat. 511 (1954); 21 U.S.C. x 364a.
402Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958); 21 U.S.C. x 348.
403See S. Rep. No. 795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959); see also Degnan, supra note 398, at 166.
40421 U.S.C. x 341; FDCA x 401; see also Samia Rodriguez, Food Labeling Requirements, in The Fundamentals of Law and
REgulation 238-256 ( Robert E. Brady et al. ed. 1997).
405See id. at 251.
406FDCA x 403(b) (food sold under the name of another food); x 403(d) (misleading container); x 403(f) (prominence of
required information); x 403(h) (standards of quality and ll), x 403(i)(1) (common or usual name); and x 403(k) (labeling of
articial avorings, colorings, or chemical preservative).
60The combination of local interest group politics added to special geographical considerations have encour-
aged divergent food regulations among the fty states.407 In the early 1990s, over 380 state agencies had
responsibilities similar to the FDA.408 These agencies devoted most of their resources to food regulation;
indeed, a 1989 study found that food regulation constituted 74% of the $196.06 million spent for all food
and drug control activities by the states.409 Because fewer interest groups operated at the local level, it was
often easier to pressure state legislatures to adopt favorable regulations protecting a given industry.410 The
passage of protectionist requirements also have the eect of beneting consumer safety, because experienced
ocials in industries such as the orange juice industry in Florida had better experience in dealing with the
misbranding of fruit juices.411
States also passed more stringent laws to protect consumers.412 For example, some states required the label-
ing of dairy products containing BST, despite the fact that the FDA had been unwilling to establish the state
labeling as a national standard.413 California's Proposition 65 posed another example of a state requirement
that imposed additional conicting standards.414 Peter Barton Hutt has stated that Proposition 65 is a
\debacle of a state statute...that was so contrary to federal government policies that the commissioner of
food and drugs and his general counsel felt compelled to go out...and testify against its implementation."415
407See S. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) (statement of Melvin Hinich & Richard Staelin, \Regulation of the U.S.
Food Industry), as cited in Hutt & Merrill, supra note 75, at 990.
408See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity 55 (Donna V. Porter & Robert O. Earl,
ed., 1992).
409See id. at 56; see also id. at 57 (Chart which lists total food expenditures by program category).
410See S. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 407. \Just as U.S. producers prot from Federal regulations
which raise the costs of foreign products, local producers prot from regulations which give them a competitive edge over their
competitors in other regions." Id.
411See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 69, citing AFDO
(Association of Food and Drug Ocials, 1991). Letter to the Committee on State Food Labeling, Food, and Nutrition Board,
Institute of Medicine, Washington D.C., July 1.
412See FDA Restructuring, (statement of AL Clausi, Consultant on Food Research, on Behalf of the Grocery Manufacturers
of America and the National Food Processors Association) (April 11, 1997) (\In the past few years, there has been an increase
in the activity at the state level with regard to safety standards and warning labels.")
413BST is a naturally occurring hormone in all dairy cattle that inuences milk production. See Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free
Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating Recombinant BST, 22 Col. J. Envir. L. 227 (1997).
414See supra pp. 50.
415Advocates for Industry, Consumers Swap Ripostes at AFDO Confab, 40 Food Chemical News (June 29, 1998) (debate
61States had also passed laws to protect against misbranding. By 1992, at least 34 states had misbranding
regulations pertaining to prominence.416 Many of these state regulations were very detailed. For instance,
Indiana required that the name on oleomargarine/margarine be in plain Gothic letters of a type size not less
than 20 points.417
The FDA did little to stop the trend toward increased state regulation; indeed, it may have even accelerated
it. While there are some federal statutes which preempt state food regulation,418 much of federal regulation
dealing with food merely sets a \low minimum standard permitting extensive state discretion."419 The re-
luctance of the federal government to issue laws spurred states to ll the void by developing their own food
safety laws.420 One of the most vivid examples is the \Reg. Penn. Dept. Ag." Label, which indicates com-
pliance with Pennsylvania food safety regulations.421 The FDA also stopped vigorously enforcing food safety
violations. In the mid-1980s, the FDA reversed its trend of prohibiting health claims in food labeling.422
For instance, the FDA did not take action against the Kellogg Company when the company proclaimed that
their All-Bran cereal could reduce the risk of cancer.423 The FDA even stated that it was taking on a more
relaxed enforcement role in regulating health claims related to the treatment or prevention of disease.424
on \National Uniformity: What Are the Real Issues? Is Preemption the Only Solution?").
416See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 99.
417See Ind. Code x 16-1-34-3. For more examples, see Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National
Uniformity, supra note 408, at 99-102.
418See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. x 679 (explicitly preempting state labeling regulations under the Wholesome Meat Act).
419Lathrop, supra note 396, at 903-904. For example, the USDA has regulations dening cheese pizza, but it does not dene a
minimum amount of natural cheese nor does it preclude the use of imitation cheese. See 9 C.F.R. x 319.600, as cited in Lathrop,
supra note 396, at 930, n. 155.
420See Nyberg, supra note, at 233 (starting in 1785, Massachusetts passed laws regulating labels to protect products).
421See Lathrop, supra note 396, at 904. 7 Pa. Code x 31.34. The Pennsylvania regulation states, \All products, whether
packaged in the bakery or by a packer, processor, wholesale dealer or a distributor, shall bear the words `Registered with the
Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture." Id.
422See Michele M. Bradley, The States' Role in Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The Eect of the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 Food & Drug L. J. 650, 651 (1994). FDA regulations strictly controlled the claims
manufacturer's could make about a food's nutritive value. See id.
423See id.
424See id; 52 Fed. Reg. 28, 843 (Aug. 4, 1987).
62State attorney generals lled the relaxed void of enforcement caused by the FDA's lax policies.425
C. The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (\NLEA"), like FDAMA, was largely enacted in response to the
increased role of the states in regulating food labeling and advertising.426 The nature of the food industry
had changed, as new products increased the probability of conicting state regulations. Further, in the
1980s, scientic investigations yielded evidence demonstrating the relationship between dietary habits and
the prevalence of disease.427 As a result of such studies, consumers became increasingly concerned about
nutrition information.428
The NLEA amended the FDCA to require standard-format nutrition labeling for most food products.429 The
NLEA achieved national uniformity by preempting state standards dealing with nutrition labeling, nutrition
content and health claims, and standards of identity that diered from FDA standards and by authorizing
states to cooperate in enforcing the standards with the FDA.430 Some state and local misbranding statutes
relating to standards of identity and imitation labeling were preempted upon passage of the Act, while other
sections were preempted either after 12 months of enactment431 or once a study had been completed.432
425See Bradley, supra note 422, at 114. States began to coordinate investigations and prosecutions via the National Association
of Attorneys General, and advocated a tougher federal policy similar to that adopted under the NLEA. See id.
426See id. at 113. The stated purpose of the NLEA was to clarify and strengthen the FDA's authority to require nutrition
labeling on foods, and to establish circumstances when claims made be made about a food's nutrient content. H.R. Rep. No.
538, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990).
427See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 4.
428See id.
429See Bradley, supra note 422, at 244.
430See Craig Jordan, Preemption and Uniform Enforcement of Food Marketing Regulations, 49 Food & Drug L. J. (1994).
The NLEA's preemption provisions were passed despite opposition from the FDA and the White House. See 55 Fed. Reg. 5191
(Feb. 13, 1990); Hearings on S. 1425 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 164
(1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
431These provisions related to 1) manufacturer's name and address (x 403(d)(1)); net weight (x 403(e)(2)); and ingredient
labeling. (x 403(i)(2)).
432Preemption occurring after a mandated study included 1) food sold under the name of another food (x 403(b)); misleading
container (x 403(d)); prominence of required label information (x 403(f)); standards of quality and ll (x 403(h)); common or
usual name (( x 403(i) ((1)); and labeling of articial avorings, colorings or chemical preservatives (x 403(k)).
63Signicantly, the NLEA did not preempt state safety warnings, such as California's Proposition 65.433 States
also remained free to challenge false or misleading labeling.434 Under NLEA, state could also enact state
laws with requirements identical to federal but with dierent remedies and penalties.435
In a study commissioned by the FDA, the Institute of Medicine (\IOM") reviewed the implementation of
some of the NLEA provisions regarding food labeling.436 The study found that more than 45 states had
adopted the Uniform State Food, Drug and Cosmetic Bill, and 23 states had adopted all or parts of federal
regulations by reference.437 In reviewing areas of discrepancy between the states and federal governments,
the study, for the most part, found that NLEA had been adequately implemented and that the federal
requirements should preempt state requirements under x 403.438 The study, however, found that the FDA
had not adequately implemented x 403(d) dealing with container ll and deceptive packaging.439 The report
noted that at least seven states had enacted statutes related to deceptive packaging, and that California
had determined a need to \implement additional requirements to further consumer protection...and [had]
adopted the language of the [Federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966] for nonfunctional slack ll."440
In making its recommendation, the report concluded that the FDA should follow the lead of California and
adopt the FPLA denition for enforcing FDCA x 403(d).441
D. The Need for National Uniformity for Food
433Pub. L. No. 101-535, x 6(c)(2), 104 Stat. at 2364.
434Pub. L. No. 101-535, x 6 (c)(1), 104 Stat. at 2364.
435See Bradley, supra note 422, at 123.
436See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 1. NLEA directed that
that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, through the FDA, implement a study of the implementation of x
403 provisions. The \charge" to the Committee was to assemble a listing of relevant state and local laws dealing with the six
misbranding provisions of the FDCA, to describe the provisions of each of the relevant state and local laws, and to assess the
extent to which each of the provisions of x 403 are being implemented under current and proposed regulations. See id. at 2.
437See id. at 55.
438See id. at 8-9. The study found the implementation adequate under x 403(b) (food under the name of another food); x
403(f) (placement of required information); x 403(h) (standards of quality and ll); x 403(i)(1) (common or usual name); and
x 403(k) (articial colors, adequate avors, and chemical preservatives); see also id. at 11-25.
439See id. at 12-14.
440Id. at 13.
441See id. at 14.
64The same concerns animating national uniformity for drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics also favor na-
tional uniformity for food. Since producers must comply with conicting state laws regarding labeling,
advertising, and food formulations, cost is increased.442 The Institute of Medicine study found that the cost
of monitoring for nonuniformity and complying with at least 77,600 food labels exceeded $80 million per
year.443 Food manufacturing and distribution is also slowed, and consumers, faced with dierent information
and warnings, may be confused as to what is the correct formulation.444 Contrary to what opponents of
national uniformity may argue, adopting national uniformity for food would ultimately fulll the original
purpose of the 1906 Act. As the House Report on the 1906 Act stated:
...the laws and regulations of the dierent States are diverse, confusing, and often contradictory.
What one State now requires, the adjoining State may forbid. Our food products are not raised
principally in the States for consumption. State boundary lines are unknown in our commerce,
except by reason of local regulation and laws, such as State pure food laws. It is desirable, as far
as possible, that the commerce between the states be unhindered. One of the hoped for results
of a national law on the subject on pure foods is the bringing about of a uniformity of laws and
regulations on the part of the States within their own several borders.445
Uniformity increases food productivity, since it eliminates the need for additional production lines to com-
ply with divergent regulations.446 Uniformity also helps modernize food regulation and ensure the optimal
standards of consumer protection.447 Resources can be better allocated, since instead of states promulgating
regulations, they can devote scarce resources to the enforcement of federal standards.448 Nonuniformity also
decreases innovation. The Institute of Medicine study found that the uncertainty of state regulation \limited
the choice of ingredients and thereby delayed the completion of new food formulations."449
442Bradley, supra note 422, at 114.
443See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 155, 158. Many large
companies employ between 1 and 10 employees who monitor state activities, receiving a salary of $80,000 a year. See id. at
154. A single label change incurred a cost of $1000. See id. at 158. These gures would be much higher now, as the study was
conducted nearly 10 years ago.
444See id.
446S. Doc. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978), as cited in Hutt & Merrill, supra note 75, at 990.
447See id.
448See id. States can also coordinate state enforcement activities with the FDA, such as by supplementing eld forces,
exchanging laboratory results, and use FDA resources where expert testimony is called for.. See id.
449See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 156.
65Changes in the food industry over the past 100 years have made national uniformity necessary. With the
rise of a national distribution network, manufacturers no longer have complete control over the geographic
distribution of products.450 Product distributors and retailers control the market, and conduct price dis-
counts \targeted" to performance requirements, such as minimum quantities or in-store displays.451 When
distributors notice regional price dierences, they often buy in excess of their needs and move their products
to other regions where the discount is not available.452 The eect of this system is that products and la-
bels \designed for one market will almost inevitably be distributed throughout the United States," thereby
increasing the desire of manufacturers to form consistent labels."453
Since 1906, splintered federal regulation has only exacerbated the disharmony between state and federal
regulation.454 Currently, more than twelve dierent agencies administer more than 35 laws dealing with
food regulation.455 There have been recent calls to create a single agency with responsibility to administer
federal food laws.456 In an August 1998 report, the National Academy of Sciences report noted that the
current food safety system is not equipped to meet new challenges, and that Congress should establish
a uniform and centralized agency to handle safety activities, including outbreak management, standard-
setting, inspection, monitoring, surveillance, risk assessment, enforcement, and education.457 Having the
450See id. at 49.
451See id.
452See id.
453Id. at 50.
454As Dychman notes, \The agencies have made attempts to coordinate their activities to overcome the fragmentation and
avoid duplication or gaps in coverage, but history has shown that as time passes, such eorts frequently prove to be ineective."
Testimony before Committee, Duplication of Food Safety Regulation (statement of Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director, Food and
Agriculture Issues, Resources, Community and Economic Development Division) (August 4, 1999).
455Id. The two primary agencies responsible for food safety are the Food Safety and Inspection Service, under the United
States Department of Agriculture (\USDA"), which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and some egg products; and
the FDA, responsible for the safety of all other foods. Other agencies with food safety responsibilities include the Department of
Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Research Service, and Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration;
the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service; the Department of Treasury's U.S. Customs Service and
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Trade Commission. See id.
456See id. \The most eective solution to the current fragmentation of the federal food safety system is consolidating food
safety programs under a single agency with uniform authority." Id.
457See id.
66states regulate only adds to the confusion.
National uniformity would also further the goals of globalization.458 The process of globalization is fur-
ther complicated in the food industry because of dierent cultural attitudes about food.459 For example,
European countries are more prone to see so-called natural products, such as raw milk cheese, as safe.460
The United States, however, imposes stricter controls on such unpasteurized products. In turn, the United
States imposes less control over genetically engineered foods than does the European Union.461 Uniformity
is desparately needed at the international level to eliminate the discrimination facing food distributors op-
erating internationally.462 The 1989 dispute between the United States and the European Union over the
use of beef growth hormone is a paradigmatic example of how diering regulations can lead to trade dis-
putes.463 The problems are only multiplied if states have their own rules based on geographical or cultural
idiosyncracies.
Further, food products regulated by agencies other than the FDA enjoy national uniformity. National uni-
formity has been established for organic food labeling in response to increased state regulation. In 1973,
Oregon passed the nation's rst organic certication law in response to consumer complaints of fraud and
food industry inconsistency.464 Other states quickly followed.465 By the late 1980s, 11 states had their own
458See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity, supra note 408, at 159. The Institute of
Medicine study stated that \It seems appropriate that the nation resolve its internal...dierences in preparation for eective
participation in the international food trade." Id.
459See Echols, supra note 102.
460See id. at 530.
461See id. at 537-538.
462See id.
463See Marina Gatti, Proposition 65: \Shoot First, Ask Questions Later," { Do the Bullets Really Work? Have We Shot the
Wrong Party? Will They Call Out the Bazookas? 47 Food & Drug L. J. 739, 766 (1992). In 1989, the EU banned the sale
of beef with growth hormones; the U.S. protested the ban, since the FDA had approved articial growth hormone for livestock.
See id.
464Or. Rev. Stat. x 632.925 (1973).
465For an overview of state laws dealing with organic certication, see Lathrop, supra note 396, at 890-894.
67rules and denitions, and 33 private agencies certied \'organic"' according to very diverse standards."466 To
respond to the twin problems caused by the divergent labeling { namely consumer confusion and restrained
interstate commerce.467 Congress designed legislation to oer consistent treatment of organic foods, regard-
ing production, processing, marketing, and retailing.468 The Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products
Act also contain express labeling provisions ensuring national uniformity.469
E. Recent Action to Establish National Uniformity for Food
Congress has sought to extend the spirit of the NLEA to achieve greater uniformity in food labeling and
safety standards. Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire had drafted an amendment to FDAMA that
would have overturned state food labeling laws.470 This amendment would have eectively overturned
state warning notices on the risks of eating raw shellsh that had been passed in Louisiana, California and
Florida. The amendment, however, failed to make its way into the FDAMA compromise bills.471 In the
House, Representative Greg Ganske spoke about federal preemption of food labeling laws, but failed to
oer the amendment.472 Legislation was introduced in both the 105th473and 106th Congress474 to \nish
the work begun by the [NLEA]...by providing the same uniformity for food adulteration, misbranding,
466Consumers, Industry Win with USDA's New National Uniformity Rule for Organic Foods, PR Newswire, (December 15,
1997).
467See Traupman, Congress Eyes National Organic Law, New Farm, Feb. 1990, at 40 (noting that \[a] national organic
certication program will ease problems in interstate commerce [and further that] large supermarket chains concerned about
verifying the authenticity of organic items...will more readily purchase organic food if federal standards are in place.") Id. as
cited in Lathrop, supra note 396, at 930, n. 79.
468Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, xx 2101-2123.
469See Edward Dunkelberger, Food Law Reform and Federal Preemption: You Can't Have One Without the Other, Legal
Backgrounder (April 28, 1995).
470FDA Reform Legislation Begins Moving in House with Markup, 39 Food Chemical News (Sept. 22, 1997).
471FDA Reform Given Bipartisan Committee Push Toward House Floor, 5 Food Labeling News (Oct. 2, 1997); see also
FDA Food Reform May Play Second Fiddle to Drug and Device Issues Before Congress, 5 Food Labeling News (February
6, 1997).
472Id.
473Senate Bill 2356 was introduced by Senator Pat Roberts, a member of the Senate Agriculture Committee and former
Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee. 144 Cong. Rec. S9044 (statement of Sen. Harkin) (July 27, 1998).
474Roberts Re-Introduces National Uniformity Bill to Preempt Food Labeling Laws, 41 Food Chemical News (May 31, 1999).
68and warnings."475 The bills, introduced by Senator Pat Roberts, would prevent states from enforcing food
warning requirements unless they are identical to those of the FDA.476 States could petition the FDA for
an exemption from the uniformity standard if it protected an important public interest, would not cause
a violation of a federal law, and would not unduly burden interstate commerce.477 States, however, would
remain free to regulate sanitation by imposing requirements for freshness dating, open date labeling, state
inspection stamps, religious dietary labeling, organic or natural designation, returnable bottle labeling,
unit pricing, and geographic labeling.478 The bill would also not interfere with consumer advisories for
food service establishments or those recommended by the FDA's Food Code. Opponents of the national
uniformity legislation argue that Congress is merely attempting to deregulate at the state level.479 The
Center for Science in the Public Interest, an outspoken critic of the reform legislation, says that states pass
legislation to safeguard foods, because the FDA has not acted.480
As with drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics, Congress needs to act to establish national uniformity for food
regulation. The United States' food supply is the safest in the world,481 such that it is simply unnecessary for
states to impose an additional layer of regulation. Further, the states should remain free to enforce federal
laws as they deem t, and to participate in eorts such as the Interstate Milk Shippers and the Interstate
Shellsh agreements.482 As with drugs and cosmetics, states should also be able to petition the FDA to
475Senate Bill Would Establish Uniform Food Safety Labeling, 6 Food Labeling News (August 5, 1998.)
476Brian Folkerts of the National Food Processors Association said that the bill was \a rst step forward in eliminating
potential food label confusion for consumers." Roberts Re-Introduces National Uniformity Bill to Preempt Food Labeling Laws,
41 Food Chemical News (May 31, 1999).
477See id.
478Id.
479GMA Aiding Committees in Drafting `National Uniformity' Food Legislation, Food Labeling News (May 20, 1998.)
480See id. The CSPI argues that since 1976, sta in the FDA's Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition has declined by
20%. See id.
481See Robert Sussman, Proposed Changes in Food Safety Legislation, 49 Food & Drug L. J. 421, 421 (1994). (\These
proposed changes will build and improve upon the world's most sophisticated and eective food protection system and will
culminate in the reduction of pesticides in our food supply and the ecosystem.")
482See National Uniformity Proposal by GMA will Accommodate Many Concerns of State Ocials, 39 Food Chemical News
69make an idea a national requirement.483 This would be consistent w/ the Institute of Medicine's nding that
state laws are often a good starting point for FDA regulation where FDA rules are not deemed adequate.484
VIII. Conclusion
As Peter Barton Hutt said, \A nationwide market, policed by a strong and powerful nationwide regulatory
agency, demands a nationwide regulatory system to go with it. By establishing clear regulatory goals and
requiring public accountability, the agency will be more ecient and more eective"485 Establishing national
uniformity for all FDA-regulated products would go a long way toward ensuring the scientic supremacy of
the FDA and in ensuring a continued supply of the safest foods, drugs, and cosmetics to American consumers.
Uniform national standards will cut costs and eliminate the burdens of complying with fty-one dierent
state regimes. Uniformity will also work in tandem with the goal of achieving international uniformity in
ensuring the safety of the world's food, drug and cosmetic supply. While the FDA has a dierent regulatory
system for each product, the system that the FDA creates for each product is an appropriate mechanism for
achieving the optimal level of safety. If the FDA and the United State want to strive for a uniform system
of regulation of FDA products, it must make further revisions to FDAMA and establish that FDA rules
and regulations will preempt state product liability suits.486 The FDA cannot achieve national uniformity
without ensuring to manufacturers and food suppliers that compliance with FDA standards will allow them
to escape liability. Further, if the goal of national uniformity is one worth pursuing { as this paper argues
(June 16, 1997).
483See id.
484See supra p. 69. For instance, the Institute of Medicine recommended that California's adoption of the FPLA's denition for
nonfunctional slack ll be followed by the FDA. See Institute of Medicine, Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity,
supra note 408, at 12-14; Cal. Bus & Prof. Code x 12606 (does not require proof that the slack ll is misleading or deceptive).
485Hearings on H.R. 3200 Food Amendments and the Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996 Before the Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment, 103rd Cong. (May 1, 1996) (statement of Peter Barton Hutt on behalf of the Grocery Manufacturers
Association of America and the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association).
486This paper does not suggest that preemption of federal standards would be unlimited. FDA compliance defense should
be structured as compliance with FDA regulatory standards rather than mere FDA approval. \Any conclusion that the
FDA's approval represents a considered assessment that an approved drug's therapeutic benets outweigh its risks, however,
is unwarranted without a manufacturer investigation that complies with FDA requirements for adequate and well-controlled
studies of the new drug, accurate reporting of the results of those tests, and truthful responses to inquiries by the FDA." Green,
supra note 149, at 481, 496; see also Rissier, supra note 13, at 1415-1421 (discussion of qualied federal preemption).
70it is { it is would not make sense to have a suboptimal national uniformity system; surely, if the FDA
establishes national standards, but yet, manufacturers or suppliers could still be held liable for failing to
follow a state-imposed duty \more protective" than the federal standards, the benets gleaned from national
uniformity { in terms of decreased costs and increased innovation { will suer.
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